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**In the  
Supreme Court of the United States**

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. **78-689**

**ALEXANDER SHARP, II,  
COMMISSIONER OF THE MASSACHUSETTS  
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE,  
APPELLANT,**

v.

**CINDY WESTCOTT, ET AL.,  
APPELLEES.**

**ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR  
THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS**

**Jurisdictional Statement**

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## Table of Contents.

Opinion below	2
Jurisdiction	2
Statutory provision involved	4
Question presented	4
Statement	4
The question is substantial	8
I. Section 407's legislative history demonstrates the propriety of a principal wage-earner standard for eligibility	12
II. Section 407's structure substantiates the correctness of a principal wage-earner standard for eligibility	15
III. The District Court improperly failed to assess the comparative cost of the alternative remedies as an index of how Congress would itself have chosen to correct section 407's underinclusiveness	17
Conclusion	20
Appendix A	1a
Appendix B	3a
Appendix C	12a
Appendix D	13a
Appendix E	15a

## Table of Authorities Cited.

### CASES.

Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977)	5, 6n, 12n
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977)	9n

Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977)	9n
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)	19n
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)	9n
Jablon v. Secretary of H.E.W., 399 F. Supp. 118 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 430 U.S. 924 (1977)	18n
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974)	9n
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968)	5
McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U.S. 21 (1975)	3
Moreno v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 345 F. Supp. 310 (D. D.C. 1972), aff'd, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)	18n
Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707 (1975)	5n
Quern v. Mandley, 98 S. Ct. 2068 (1978)	19
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975)	9n
Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251 (1974)	15n
Stevens v. Califano, 448 F. Supp. 1313 (N.D. Ohio 1978)	12n, 14n, 16n, 17n
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960)	3
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970)	9n, 11n, 12n, 15n

#### CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS.

United States Constitution	
Fifth Amendment	6
Fourteenth Amendment	6
28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976)	3
Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq. (1970) & Supp. V 1975)	4
§ 402, 42 U.S.C. § 602	5
§ 403, 42 U.S.C. § 603	5, 18n
§ 407, 42 U.S.C. § 607	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 et seq.



# TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED.

iii

42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(10)	5
49 Stat. 627-629 (1935)	4
75 Stat. 75 (1961)	5, 12
81 Stat. 882 (1968)	5, 13

# RULES AND REGULATIONS.

## 45 C.F.R.

§ 233.20(a)(7)(ii)	16n
§ 233.20(a)(11)	16n
§ 233.90(c)(1)(iv)	6n
§ 233.100	14n
§ 233.100(a)(1)	15n

## 6 Mass. CHSR III, Subch. A

Pt. 301, § 301.03	6n
Pt. 303, Subpt. A, § 303.01	6n
Pt. 303, Subpt. A, § 303.04	6n

## Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States

Rule 15(1)(c)	11n
Rule 15(3)	2n

# MISCELLANEOUS.

Griffiths, Sex Discrimination in Income Security Programs, 49 Notre Dame Lawyer 534 (1974)	14n
H.R. Rep. No. 28, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961)	5n, 12n, 16n
H.R. Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967)	13n
Note, Extension Versus Invalidation of Underinclusive Statutes: A Remedial Alternative, 12 Colum. J.L. and Soc. Probs. 115 (1975)	9n, 12n, 18n

S. Rep. No. 165, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961)	5n, 12n
S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967)	13n
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1964)	12n

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**ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR  
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**Jurisdictional Statement**

Appellant appeals from the order of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, entered on August 9, 1978, denying his motion to clarify or, alternatively, to amend its remedial order of April 20, 1978, and submits this statement to show that the Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction of the appeal and that a substantial question is presented.

## Opinion Below

The District Court's opinion which accompanied its order of April 20, 1978, is not yet reported. Appellant incorporates by reference into this jurisdictional statement the copy of that opinion appended to the jurisdictional statement filed with this Court in *Califano v. Westcott*, No. 78-437 (September 14, 1978), which arises from the same proceeding.<sup>1</sup> The District Court's order of August 9, 1978, included an opinion which is not yet reported. A copy of that order is appended to this statement (State App. D, 13a-14a).<sup>2</sup>

## Jurisdiction

On April 20, 1978, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts entered an order declaring unconstitutional and enjoining the enforcement of a portion of 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).<sup>3</sup> The Secretary of the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (Secretary) and the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare (Commissioner) were defendants in that proceeding. On May 17, 1978, the Secretary filed a

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<sup>1</sup> This statement refers to that copy of the opinion in the following manner: (Fed. App. A, 1A-37A). Appellant incorporates this copy by reference in reliance upon the advice of the Office of the Clerk and U.S. Supreme Court Rule 15(3).

<sup>2</sup> The alphabetical designation of the appendices contained within this statement reflects the chronology of the proceedings below. References to the other appendices contained within this statement follow this form.

<sup>3</sup> This statement incorporates by reference the copy of that initial order appended to the jurisdictional statement filed in *Califano v. Westcott*, No. 78-437. This statement refers to that copy of the order as (Fed. App. B, 39A-42A).

notice of his appeal to this Court from that order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976).

The District Court's initial order also required the Commissioner to reformulate the public assistance program established by 42 U.S.C. § 607 in order to correct its underinclusiveness (Fed. App. B, 40A-42A). After the Commissioner tentatively indicated how he might extend the program, the District Court observed that its original order did not contain any language authorizing the Commissioner's proposal.<sup>4</sup>

On June 7, 1978, the Commissioner filed a motion to clarify or, alternatively, to amend the District Court's order of April 20, 1978, in order to obtain a definitive ruling from the District Court on whether his plan was a permissible remedy for the statutory defect (State App. B, 3a-11a). On August 9, 1978, the District Court denied the Commissioner's motion on its merits (State App. D, 13a-14a). On August 24, 1978, the Commissioner filed a notice of his appeal from this final order to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976) (State App. E, 15a).

Where one party has previously appealed to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252 from a decision holding an act of Congress unconstitutional, section 1252 provides that:

A party who has received notice of appeal under this section shall take any subsequent appeal or cross appeal to the Supreme Court.

Cases supporting this Court's jurisdiction include *McLucas v. DeChamplain*, 421 U.S. 21 (1975), and *United States v. Raines*, 362 U.S. 17 (1960).

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<sup>4</sup>The District Court's observation was set forth in its order of May 31, 1978 (State App. A, 1a-2a).

### Statutory Provision Involved

Section 407 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), is appended to the Secretary's jurisdictional statement in *Califano v. Westcott*, No. 78-437.<sup>5</sup>

### Question Presented

Whether the District Court erred as a matter of remedy when it ordered that public benefits which had previously been available to a two-parent family if the father were unemployed must be extended to such families if either parent were unemployed, thereby rejecting the more limited extension of benefits to only those families whose principal wage-earner was unemployed.

### Statement

The Social Security Act of 1935 (Act) established the Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, as it is now known, to provide financial assistance to families whose children were needy because of the death, absence or incapacity of a parent. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 *et seq.* (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (originally enacted by 49 Stat. 627-629 [1935]). The Congressional purpose behind the AFDC program was to have the federal and state governments assume financial responsibility for "children in families without a 'breadwinner,' 'wage

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<sup>5</sup>This statement incorporates that copy by reference as (Fed. App. D, 45A-48A).

earner,' or 'father,'" *King v. Smith*, 392 U.S. 309, 328 (1968), in order "to allow widows and divorced mothers to care for their children at home without having to go to work." *Batterton v. Francis*, 432 U.S. 416, 418 (1977). If the Secretary determines that the plan of a state electing to participate in the AFDC program meets the standards set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 602 (Supp. V. 1975), that state can receive partial federal reimbursement for both the cost of the benefits which it provides and its administrative costs. 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). If a state also elects to participate in the medical assistance (Medicaid) program established under the Act, individuals receiving AFDC benefits are entitled to receive Medicaid benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(10) (Supp. V 1975).

In 1961, Congress expanded the AFDC program "to assist children who are needy simply because the family breadwinner is unable to find work." *Batterton v. Francis*, 432 U.S. 416, 419 (1977).<sup>6</sup> Congress did so by adding section 407 to the Act. 75 Stat. 75 (1961). As subsequently amended by 81 Stat. 882 (1968), section 407 redefined the class of eligible families to include those whose children were needy simply because of their father's unemployment.<sup>7</sup> This supplementary component of the AFDC program is known as the Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Unemployed Father (AFDC-UF) program. All requirements of the AFDC program (other than the requisite death, absence, or incapacity of a parent) apply to the AFDC-UF program.<sup>8</sup> Along with approximately one-

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<sup>6</sup> See H.R. Rep. No. 28, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1961); S. Rep. No. 165, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1961).

<sup>7</sup> This Court has reviewed the development of the AFDC-UF program in *Philbrook v. Glodgett*, 421 U.S. 707, 709-711 (1975), and *Batterton v. Francis*, 432 U.S. 416, 419-420 (1977).

<sup>8</sup> In short, AFDC-UF provides to certain intact (i.e., two-parent) families what AFDC provides to families with only one parent in the home. For pur-

half of the states,<sup>9</sup> Massachusetts has elected to participate in the AFDC-UF program.<sup>10</sup> In conformity with section 407, Massachusetts has defined eligibility for its AFDC-UF program in terms of the unemployment of the father.<sup>11</sup>

In January, 1977, plaintiffs filed this class action in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts asserting that section 407 and the implementing state regulations violated *inter alia* their equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs argued that the statutory classification was fatally underinclusive because it failed to provide AFDC-UF benefits on the basis of the mother's unemployment to a family which was otherwise identical to an eligible family. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the continued enforcement of section 407 and the state regulations (Fed. App. A, 1A-3A).

Plaintiffs moved for certification of their class and for summary judgment on their federal constitutional claim (Fed. App. A, 1A-4A). The Secretary opposed their summary judgment motion on the merits, but at the same time argued that the proper remedy, should one be needed, was to extend, rather than strike down, the AFDC-UF program. The Commissioner adopted the Secretary's arguments in defense of section 407, and went on to argue independently in favor of extension rather than invalidation of the AFDC-UF program. On April 20, 1978, the District Court certified a class consisting of all families within Massachusetts which would be eligible for

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poses of AFDC eligibility, an incapacitated parent is one whose physical or mental ability to provide parental care has been substantially reduced. 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(1)(iv).

<sup>9</sup> *Batterton v. Francis*, 432 U.S. 416, 420 (1977).

<sup>10</sup> See 6 Mass. CHSR III, Subch. A, Pt. 301, § 301.03; Pt. 303, Subpt. A, §§ 303.01, 303.04.

<sup>11</sup> 6 Mass. CHSR III, Subch. A, Pt. 303, Subpt. A, § 303.01.



the AFDC-UF program but for the program's exclusion of families in need because of the mother's unemployment (Fed. App. A, 11A-19A; Fed. App. B, 39A-40A). Ruling that the statutory classification was invalid as underinclusive (Fed. App. A, 19A-33A), the District Court selected the extension of the AFDC-UF program as its remedy (Fed. App. A, 34A-37A). The District Court enjoined the Commissioner "from refusing to grant AFDC and Medicaid benefits to families with children deprived of support or care because of the unemployment of the mother in the same amounts and under the same standards as he provides such benefits to families deprived of support or care because of the unemployment of the father . . ." (Fed. App. B, 41A-42A). The District Court also enjoined the Secretary from the enforcement of section 407 "insofar as it prohibits defendant Califano from approving a Massachusetts plan or federal matching funds for Massachusetts to pay AFDC or Medicaid benefits to families deprived of support or care due to the unemployment of the mother" (Fed. App. B, 40A-41A). The effect of these orders was to require the Commissioner rather than the Secretary to design a valid sex-neutral AFDC-UF program.

On May 10, 1978, the Commissioner moved for a partial stay of the court's initial order to allow him to develop and implement a plan for compliance with that order. In that motion, he indicated his intention to consider whether the unemployment of a family's principal wage-earner could validly become the standard of eligibility in a sex-neutral AFDC-UF program. While granting the requested stay, the District Court pointed out in its order of May 31, 1978, that its original order did not "contain any language which authorizes the imposition of . . . a primary wage earner limitation . . . on the awarding of AFDC-UF and/or Medicaid benefits by the defendant Sharp" (State App. A, 2a). In order to resolve whether the incorporation of a principal wage-earner standard

was consistent with section 407, the Commissioner then moved the District Court to clarify or, alternatively, to amend its initial order so as to permit the provision of AFDC-UF benefits only to families with children deprived of parental support by the principal wage-earner's unemployment (State App. B, 3a-11a). Plaintiffs opposed this motion. On July 19, 1978, the District Court extended its stay of its initial order so that it could give further consideration to the Commissioner's motion. It also permitted the parties to submit further documents supporting their respective positions on the principal wage-earner issue (State App. C, 12a). Plaintiffs argued that, as the father's unemployment had previously been sufficient to establish eligibility, the mother's unemployment should similarly be sufficient to establish eligibility under a sex-neutral AFDC-UF program regardless of the father's concurrent employment. The Secretary remained silent on this issue.

On August 9, 1978, the District Court denied the Commissioner's motion to clarify or, alternatively, to amend its order of April 20, 1978. Its reasons were that: (1) any reformulation of the AFDC-UF program that would go beyond its initial order should be left to Congress, and (2) it could not authorize Massachusetts to narrow the federal standard of eligibility for the AFDC-UF program (State App. D, 13a-14a). By its refusal to adopt a principal wage-earner standard, the District Court necessarily approved the remedy advanced by the plaintiffs. Accordingly, on August 24, 1978, the Commissioner filed his notice of appeal (State App. E, 15a).

### **The Question is Substantial**

This appeal presents a narrow but significant issue of remedy. Full consideration of the merits of this appeal will

not prove burdensome because this Court must, in any event, review the role that sexual identity plays within the structure and function of section 407 in order to dispose of the Secretary's appeal. If this Court chooses to accept briefs and oral argument on section 407's constitutionality in *Califano v. Westcott*, No. 78-437, it should, therefore, also give plenary consideration to this appeal in order to review the full scope of the District Court's decision.<sup>12</sup>

The extension of the AFDC-UF program which the District Court approved as the remedy for section 407's underinclusiveness is overly broad and impinges upon the legislative prerogative of Congress. While extension may properly provide an alternative to invalidation as a remedy for underinclusiveness,<sup>13</sup> the judiciary must always proceed within the channel markers established by the legislative history and the statutory framework of the defective classification. Particularly in the area of sex discrimination, where this Court has emphasized the subtle significance of statutory context,<sup>14</sup> a lower court's

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<sup>12</sup> In his jurisdictional statement filed in *Califano v. Westcott*, No. 78-437, the Secretary stated that he does not challenge the District Court's remedy. *Id.*, 6 at n. 5. While indicating some uncertainty as to what that remedy is, the Secretary's waiver of any challenge to the remedy confirms that this Court can only ensure full review of that issue by giving plenary consideration to the Commissioner's appeal.

<sup>13</sup> *Welsh v. United States*, 398 U.S. 333, 361 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). See generally Note, *Extension Versus Invalidation of Underinclusive Statutes: A Remedial Alternative*, 12 Colum. J.L. and Soc. Probs. 115 (1975).

<sup>14</sup> E.g., *Califano v. Goldfarb*, 430 U.S. 199, 225 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (cases employing heightened levels of scrutiny should not be uncritically carried over into the field of social insurance); *Geduldig v. Aiello*, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (where this Court rejected an equal protection challenge to a state insurance program excluding coverage of disabilities attributable to normal pregnancies on the ground that its limited coverage did not favor one sex over the other). See also *Califano v. Webster*, 430 U.S. 313 (1977), *Schlesinger v. Ballard*, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), and *Kahn v. Shevin*, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), where this Court upheld gender-based discrimination against

sweeping exercise of the exceptional power of judicial extension merits plenary review. Proper judicial deference to the acts of Congress permits no less. While the District Court declined to adopt the narrow extension of the AFDC-UF program advocated by the Commissioner on the ground that any reformulation of the program going beyond its initial order should be left to Congress (State App. D, 13a), the broader extension which it thereby sanctioned decisively impinges upon the Congressional prerogative. The District Court thus honored the principle of judicial deference to Congress in the breach.<sup>15</sup>

By giving plenary consideration to this appeal, this Court will preserve the option of forging a moderate remedy on a middle ground between upholding the constitutionality of section 407, as the Secretary requests, and the open-ended expansion of the AFDC-UF program that plaintiffs advocate. While the Solicitor General's arguments in support of the constitutionality of the AFDC-UF program deserve attention, only the Commissioner's arguments defining the proper corrective for section 407's underinclusiveness will raise for decision the difficult remedial issues which permeate this case. In short, should this Court give plenary consideration to the Secretary's appeal, this Court's appellate role would be best served through commensurate review of the Commissioner's appeal.

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men in light of the respective statutes' goal of assisting women in overcoming the barriers which past sexist practice had imposed on them.

<sup>15</sup>The other ground for the District Court's order of August 9, 1978, reflects a miscomprehension of the Commissioner's position on the proper form of extension (State App. D, 13a). Contrary to the District Court's suggestion, the Commissioner did not below and does not now argue that Massachusetts can impose additional limitations on the AFDC-UF program beyond those established by federal law. The Commissioner argues, rather, that the legislative history and statutory structure of section 407 require — or at least permit — the sex-neutral form of the AFDC-UF program to condition eligibility upon the status of the family's principal wage-earner.

The Commissioner's motion to clarify or, alternatively, to amend the District Court's order of April 20, 1978, presented a single question: whether the legislative history and statutory framework of the AFDC-UF program dictated the replacement of the invalid term "father" by a sex-neutral reference to the family's principal wage-earner as the parent whose unemployment can establish eligibility under section 407 (State App. B, 3a-5a).<sup>16</sup> Two principles of the federal common law of remedies govern the answer to that question. First, the judiciary may extend a statutory classification to cure its under-inclusiveness only where Congress would itself have elected to do so. The judiciary's power is limited to rendering "what Congress plainly did intend . . . constitutional."<sup>17</sup> The critical judicial inquiry in this regard is what form of a sex-neutral AFDC-UF program, if any, would Congress have established if it had known of section 407's constitutional defect when it

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<sup>16</sup> This jurisdictional statement focuses on whether the history and structure of section 407 require the incorporation of a principal wage-earner standard into a sex-neutral AFDC-UF program. The Commissioner reserves the question whether section 407 might permit the Secretary to promulgate such a standard as a matter of administrative discretion for argument in his brief on the merits. See U.S. Supreme Court Rule 15(1)(c). In his jurisdictional statement in *Califano v. Westcott*, No. 78-437, the Secretary's characterization of the District Court's remedy implies that he views the proper form of a sex-neutral AFDC-UF program to remain subject to his discretion. He observes that:

[T]he remedy . . . apparently leaves the Secretary free to redefine "unemployment" by regulation in any gender-neutral way . . .

*Id.*, 6 at n. 5. This remark does not, however, reveal the Secretary's position on how to define the parent whose unemployment can establish a family's eligibility.

<sup>17</sup> *Welsh v. United States*, 398 U.S. 333, 366 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).

enacted that statute.<sup>18</sup> Second, the judiciary may “hazard the necessary statutory repairs [only] if they can be made within the administrative framework of the statute and without impairing other legislative goals . . .”<sup>19</sup> In sum, the Congressional intent underlying a statutory classification and its administrative structure determine the form which judicial extension must take.

#### I. SECTION 407’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY DEMONSTRATES THE PROPRIETY OF A PRINCIPAL WAGE-EARNER STANDARD FOR ELIGIBILITY.

The legislative history behind the enactment of section 407 by 75 Stat. 75 (1961) is undisputed. Congress intended to expand the existing AFDC program to cover families with dependent children rendered needy by the unemployment of the family “breadwinner.”<sup>20</sup> Congress’ use of this term reveals the governing legislative intent behind section 407. The “breadwinner” is that “member of a family or household whose wages solely or largely defray its living expenses.”<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> See Note, *Extension Versus Invalidation of Underinclusive Statutes: A Remedial Alternative*, 12 Colum. J.L. and Soc. Probs. 115, 121-122 (1975).

<sup>19</sup> *Welsh v. United States*, 398 U.S. 333, 366 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).

<sup>20</sup> See H.R. Rep. No. 28, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1961); S. Rep. No. 165, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1961) (the reason given for expanding the AFDC program was “to include families in which the breadwinner is unemployed”). See also *Batterton v. Francis*, 432 U.S. 416, 419 (1977). The District Court recognized this Congressional focus upon unemployed “breadwinners” (Fed. App. A, 24A-25A). See also *Stevens v. Califano*, 448 F. Supp. 1313, 1320 (N.D. Ohio 1978). The *Stevens* case involved an equal protection challenge to the AFDC-UF program identical to that raised by plaintiffs in this case. The rulings in the *Stevens* decision followed those in this case on both the constitutional and remedial issues.

<sup>21</sup> Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1964).



The District Court appropriately analyzed the import of this feature of section 407's legislative history when it observed that:

The legislators at times during the Congressional debates used the term "father" interchangeably with the terms "breadwinner," "worker" and "wage earner." This usage apparently reflected their belief that the father is generally the *primary wage earner* of the family and the mother the "homemaker."<sup>22</sup>

The term "breadwinner" thus denotes a status which only one member of a family can hold at a given time.

In 1968, Congress confirmed that the AFDC-UF program was limited to families in which the breadwinner was unemployed. It amended section 407, which had since 1961 conditioned eligibility upon the unemployment of a "parent," by 81 Stat. 882 (1968) so as to make the unemployment of the "father" the prerequisite to eligibility for the AFDC-UF program.<sup>23</sup> This gender-based restriction on eligibility must be recognized for what it was, an effort to condition eligibility

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<sup>22</sup> Fed. App. A, 24A at n. 15 (emphasis added).

<sup>23</sup> The Congressional reports concerning this amendment uniformly stated that:

This program was originally conceived as one to provide aid for the children of unemployed fathers. However, some States make families in which the father is working but the mother is unemployed eligible. The bill would not allow such situations. Under the bill, the program could apply only to the children of unemployed fathers.

H.R. Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 108 (1967); S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1967).

upon the unemployment of a family's principal wage-earner whom Congress broadly assumed to be the father.<sup>24</sup>

This legislative history demonstrates that Congress never intended to allow either parent's unemployment to establish a family's eligibility regardless of the other parent's employment status at that time.<sup>25</sup> Adoption of this dual-parent model of the AFDC-UF program, which plaintiffs advocated below and which the District Court's final order sanctioned, would grossly increase the scope and cost of the AFDC-UF program beyond what Congress envisioned. By restricting the eligibility of intact families to those whose "breadwinner" was unemployed, Congress expressly conditioned eligibility upon the status of a specific parent within the family. This commitment to a single-parent model is the dominant element in the legislative history of the AFDC-UF program.

A sex-neutral extension of the AFDC-UF program to allow unemployed mothers to establish their families' eligibility should follow the single-parent model.<sup>26</sup> A principal wage-

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<sup>24</sup> In *Stevens v. Califano*, 448 F. Supp. 1313, 1320 (N.D. Ohio 1978), the District Court observed that:

The purpose of the amendment to Section 607 . . . was to eliminate benefits to families in which the breadwinner was fully employed.

In the welfare area, Congress has commonly assumed that the father is the breadwinner. See Griffiths, *Sex Discrimination in Income Security Programs*, 49 Notre Dame Lawyer 534, 541 (1974).

<sup>25</sup> In *Stevens v. Califano*, 448 F. Supp. 1313 (N.D. Ohio 1978), the District Court recognized AFDC-UF to be "a program which Congress intended as aid to needy families in which both parents were unemployed." *Id.*, 1323 at n. 11 (emphasis added).

<sup>26</sup> While this jurisdictional statement refers solely to the criterion of unemployment, it includes within such references the other criteria for eligibility established by 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) and 45 C.F.R. 233.100.



earner standard for eligibility would implement the single-parent model in an appropriately sex-neutral manner.<sup>27</sup>

## II. SECTION 407'S STRUCTURE SUBSTANTIATES THE CORRECTNESS OF A PRINCIPAL WAGE-EARNER STANDARD FOR ELIGIBILITY.

An analysis of the administrative framework of section 407 confirms the excessive sweep of the District Court's dual-parent model of the AFDC-UF program as a corrective to its gender-based defect.<sup>28</sup> Under section 407, a family must meet both categorical and financial requirements for eligibility. The major categorical requirement is that the father must be employed for less than 100 hours per month.<sup>29</sup> The financial requirement is that the family's income may not exceed the AFDC standard of need.<sup>30</sup>

The single-parent model retains the major categorical requirement by conditioning eligibility upon the principal wage-

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<sup>27</sup> As an appendix to his motion to clarify or, alternatively, to amend the court's order of April 20, 1978, the Commissioner attached a proposed amendment to the state AFDC-UF regulations which defined the eligibility requirement in terms of deprivation caused by the unemployment of the family's principal wage-earner. In pertinent part, the proposed amendment defined the principal wage-earner to be that parent whose income was greater during the six months preceeding the month of application, reapplication or redetermination of eligibility (State App. B, 6a-11a).

<sup>28</sup> The District Court's remedial powers were limited by the principle that the judiciary may "hazard the necessary statutory repairs [only] if they can be made within the administrative framework of the statute and without impairing other legislative goals." *Welsh v. United States*, 398 U.S. 333, 366 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).

<sup>29</sup> 42 U.S.C. § 607(a) (1970); 45 C.F.R. § 233.100(a)(1)(i).

<sup>30</sup> 45 C.F.R. § 233.100(a)(1). Participating states are allowed to determine the standard of need for their respective AFDC programs. *Shea v. Vialpando*, 416 U.S. 251, 253 (1974).

earner's being employed less than 100 hours per month. The dual-parent model removes the categorical requirement, retaining only the income test. It thus allows families to maintain eligibility longer than does the single-parent model, if not indefinitely, through the following arrangement. Whenever the parent whose unemployment originally established the family's AFDC-UF eligibility becomes employed for 100 or more hours per month, the other parent can then maintain the family's eligibility on the basis of his or her present unemployment.<sup>31</sup> This revolving arrangement is capable of indefinite repetition, as, for example, among families whose parents are chronically subject to intermittent unemployment. Such a family would lose its eligibility for AFDC-UF only (1) if its income as reduced by the federal income disregards<sup>32</sup> and work-related expenses<sup>33</sup> were to exceed the maximum allowable income, or (2) if both parents began to work for 100 or more hours per month. The dual-parent model thus far exceeds Congress' original vision of the AFDC-UF program as a temporary supplement to families whose breadwinners had been laid off in the course of an economic recession.<sup>34</sup>

The dual-parent model of the AFDC-UF program would provide an income subsidy to the working poor.<sup>35</sup> With the re-

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<sup>31</sup> This sketch again simplifies the criteria established by section 407 for ease of presentation. If the second parent is unable to meet any of the other criteria, *e.g.*, having earned fifty dollars or more in six calendar quarters within any thirteen-calendar-quarter period ending within one year of the date of the family's redetermination or reapplication, that parent will not be able to maintain the family's eligibility.

<sup>32</sup> 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(11).

<sup>33</sup> 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(7)(ii).

<sup>34</sup> See H.R. Rep. No. 28, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1961).

<sup>35</sup> The District Court in *Stevens v. Califano*, 448 F. Supp. 1313, 1320 (N.D. Ohio 1978), recognized from its review of the legislative history that:

It is clear . . . that Congress did not intend the AFDC-UF program to provide aid for working poor.

removal of the major categorical requirement, the current AFDC earnings disregard formula would allow a recipient family to remain eligible until, by the Commissioner's estimate, its gross income reached the following levels:

Maximum Earnings	Number of Family Members						
	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Weekly	\$235	\$276	\$317	\$357	\$398	\$438	\$479
Annually	\$12,220	\$14,360	\$16,470	\$18,580	\$20,690	\$22,800	\$24,910

The dual-parent model would thus supplement the income of a large number of intact families that are not needy by conventional standards. Under the existing AFDC-UF program, the Commissioner has found that a family's eligibility terminates more often for categorical than financial reasons. The dual-parent model's elimination of section 407's major categorical requirement as a source of attrition would swell the size of the AFDC-UF caseload and the cost of the program.

### III. THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY FAILED TO ASSESS THE COMPARATIVE COST OF THE ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES AS AN INDEX OF HOW CONGRESS WOULD ITSELF HAVE CHOSEN TO CORRECT SECTION 407'S UNDERINCLUSIVENESS.

The District Court failed to consider the cost differential between the single-parent and the dual-parent models of the AFDC-UF program as an index to Congressional intent in its

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That court then proceeded to adopt the dual-parent model of the AFDC-UF program on the incongruous ground *inter alia* that any other remedy fell within the province of Congress. *Id.*, 1323 at n. 11.

selection of a remedy for section 407's underinclusiveness.<sup>36</sup> As set forth in affidavits filed in the District Court, the Commissioner estimates that the net incremental costs to Massachusetts of the dual-parent and single-parent models for the first year of operating an extended AFDC-UF program would respectively be \$3,525,000 and \$945,000.<sup>37</sup> The dual-parent model would thus cost Massachusetts \$2,580,000 more than the single-parent model in the first year.<sup>38</sup> The significance of this difference can be gauged from Massachusetts' net annual expenditure for AFDC benefits provided to its AFDC-UF caseload prior to April 20, 1978, which was approximately \$15,000,000. The dual-parent model's omission of section 407's major categorical requirement would, moreover, necessarily produce an increasing discrepancy between its cost and that of the single-parent model in succeeding years. The dual-

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<sup>36</sup> See Note, *Extension Versus Invalidation of Underinclusive Statutes: A Remedial Alternative*, 12 Colum. J.L. and Soc. Probs. 115, 134 (1975). When considering whether to extend an underinclusive statute, federal courts have often considered the incremental costs associated with its extension. E.g., *Jablon v. Secretary of H.E.W.*, 399 F. Supp. 118, 132 (D. Md. 1975), *aff'd*, 430 U.S. 924 (1977); *Moreno v. U.S. Department of Agriculture*, 345 F. Supp. 310, 315-316 (D. D.C. 1972), *aff'd*, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). In *Jablon*, the District Court decided to extend the statute on the ground that to require wives as well as husbands to demonstrate dependency would be more costly for administrative reasons than enjoining the enforcement of the requirement that husbands must demonstrate dependency. In *Moreno*, the court chose to extend the statute because extension would not require "the expenditure of public funds to a greater extent than now authorized." 345 F. Supp. at 316.

<sup>37</sup> These figures state the cost of both AFDC and Medicaid benefits after reimbursement at the approximate rate of 50 per cent by the federal government pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 603.

<sup>38</sup> When multiplied by the AFDC-UF programs operating in approximately twenty-five other states, this comparative figure becomes a substantial factor in the resolution of this remedial issue. In his jurisdictional statement in *Califano v. Westcott*, No. 78-437, p. 7 at n. 6, the Secretary gave the figure of \$510,700,000 for the estimated additional cost of the AFDC-UF program to the federal and state governments in the first year of assisting families in which the mother but not the father is unemployed.

parent model allows many more families to establish eligibility in the first instance; it also has a lesser capacity to reassess a recipient family's eligibility in light of shifting employment conditions.

When considering the extension of an underinclusive classification, the judiciary should recall the legitimate importance which Congress places upon the fiscal integrity of federal-state welfare programs.<sup>39</sup> In *Quern v. Mandley*, 98 S. Ct. 2068 (1978), this Court rejected a challenge to a state emergency assistance program which allegedly limited eligibility more narrowly than did the governing federal statute. It declined to impute to Congress the intention to create "an entirely open-ended program not susceptible of meaningful fiscal or programmatic control by the States."<sup>40</sup> The comparative incremental cost of the single-parent and dual-parent models indicates that Congress would have enacted the less expensive form of a sex-neutral AFDC-UF program if it had itself been called upon to remedy the underinclusiveness.

This analysis of Congress' fiscal concern is consistent with the legislative history of section 407 and its administrative framework. Whether taken together or separately, these three factors demonstrate that a sex-neutral AFDC-UF program should incorporate the eligibility requirement that the family's principal wage-earner must be unemployed.

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<sup>39</sup> E.g., *Dandridge v. Williams*, 397 U.S. 471, 478 (1970).

<sup>40</sup> *Quern v. Mandley*, 98 S. Ct. 2068, 2080 (1978).

**Conclusion**

For the reasons set forth above, the Court should note probable jurisdiction of this appeal and set the case for argument.

Respectfully submitted,

**FRANCIS X. BELLOTTI**

Attorney General

**S. STEPHEN ROSENFELD**

**PAUL W. JOHNSON**

Assistant Attorneys General

Department of the Attorney General

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(617) 727-1038

October 23, 1978

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**Appendix A.**

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS**

**CINDY AND WILLIAM WESTCOTT ET AL.**

v.

**CIVIL ACTION  
No. 77-222-F**

**JOSEPH A. CALIFANO ET AL.**

**Order.**

*May 31, 1978.*

**FREEDMAN, D.J.**

On May 15, 1978, in the above-entitled action, the state defendant, Alexander Sharp, requested a stay of this Court's Order of April 20, 1978 pending implementation of defendant Sharp's plan for compliance with that Order. This Court believes that defendant Sharp's request for a stay involves a reasonable period of time for the state defendant to fully comply with the Order of April 20, 1978. The Court, therefore, allows defendant Sharp's motion for this Court to stay that portion of its Order of April 20, 1978 which ordered that:

the operation or enforcement of the Massachusetts regulations, 6 CHSR III, Subch. A, Pt. 301, § 301.03; Pt. 303, Subpt. A, §§ 303.01 & 303.04, by the defendant, Alexander Sharp, Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare, is enjoined insofar as it prohibits defendant Sharp from granting AFDC and Medicaid to families with children deprived of support or care



because of the unemployment of the mother; and that defendant Sharp is enjoined from refusing to grant AFDC and Medicaid benefits to families with children deprived of support or care because of the unemployment of the mother in the same amounts and under the same standards as he provides such benefits to families with children deprived of support or care because of the unemployment of the father in accordance with the Massachusetts regulations, 6 CHSR III, Subch. A, Pt. 301, § 301.03; Pt. 303, Subpt. A, §§ 303.01 & 303.04.

The stay shall remain in effect until August 1, 1978, unless the defendant Sharp informs this Court at an earlier time that he is in full compliance with the above quoted portion of the Court's Order of April 20, 1978. During the period when the stay is in effect, the state defendant is ordered to identify and keep records of all members of the plaintiffs' class who have applied for AFDC-U and/or Medicaid benefits on or after April 20, 1978, so that their eligibility for benefits may be determined and appropriate benefits provided immediately upon expiration of the stay.

The Court wishes to point out at this time that the Court's Order of April 20, 1978 does *not* contain any language which authorizes the imposition of additional limitations, including a primary wage earner limitation, on the awarding of AFDC-U and/or Medicaid benefits by the defendant Sharp under the Massachusetts regulations, 6 CHSR III, Subch. A, Pt. 301, § 301.03; Pt. 303, Subpt. A, §§ 303.01 & 303.04.

This Court will look with disfavor upon any further motions in this action to extend the length of the stay.

FRANK H. FREEDMAN,  
*United States District Judge.*

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**Appendix B.**

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS**

**CINDY AND WILLIAM  
WESTCOTT, ET AL.,  
PLAINTIFFS**

**v.**

**CIVIL ACTION  
No. 77-222-F**

**JOSEPH A. CALIFANO,  
ET AL.,  
DEFENDANTS**

**Defendant Sharp's Motion to Clarify or, Alternatively,  
to Amend the Court's Order of April 20, 1978.**

Defendant Sharp moves that the Court clarify or, alternatively, that it amend its order of April 20, 1978, such that it allows the Department of Public Welfare of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Department) to provide AFDC-U benefits only to those families where needy children have been deprived of parental support or care by the unemployment of the family's principal wage-earner in accordance with the Department's proposed regulation, which is attached as Appendix A. In support of this motion, defendant Sharp states that the Court must, if it is to adhere to the legislative intent which underlies 42 U.S.C. § 607 (West Supp. III 1977), balance its extension of the AFDC-U program on a sex-neutral basis through allowance of a corresponding requirement that only the unemployment of the family's principal wage-earner can establish eligibility under the extended AFDC-U program. As

the Court's Opinion of April 20, 1978, in this action recognizes at pages 23-24, Congress established the AFDC-U program to protect those needy children deprived of parental support by the unemployment of the family's breadwinner or primary wage-earner.

In further support of this motion, defendant Sharp states that a sex-neutral AFDC-U program which does not restrict eligibility to families where the primary wage-earner is unemployed would generate a total annual cost within Massachusetts of \$23,000,000 in addition to the existing annual cost of the AFDC-U caseload prior to April 20, 1978. If the Department may restrict eligibility to cases involving the unemployment of the principal wage-earner, the total annual increment in the cost of the AFDC-U program would be approximately \$3,300,000. An analysis of these estimated cost figures is set forth in the Affidavit of Jenny Netzer in Support of Defendant Sharp's Motion to Clarify or, Alternatively, to Amend the Court's Order of April 20, 1978 (Netzer Affidavit), which is filed herewith.

Pursuant to Local Rule 12(a)(3) of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, defendant Sharp requests leave of the Court to serve his memorandum in support of this motion by June 15, 1978. Pursuant to Local Rule 12(c)(1), defendant Sharp requests an opportunity for oral argument in support of this motion. Resolution of the issue raised by this motion involves fundamental questions of statutory construction as well as financial considerations of enor-

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mous magnitude to the federal and state governments. One hour will be necessary for all parties to be heard.

By his attorney,

PAUL W. JOHNSON,  
Assistant Attorney General  
One Ashburton Place  
Room 2019  
Boston, MA 02108  
(617) 727-1022

Dated: June 7, 1978

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ATTACHMENT A.

THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS  
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE  
600 Washington Street, Boston 02111

ALEXANDER E. SHARP  
*Commissioner*

June 1, 1978

To: Department Staff

From: Alexander E. Sharp, Commissioner

Re: AFDC — *Unemployed Parent — Principal Wage Earner*

This letter transmits material for the AP policy manual concerning eligibility for AFDC of children who are deprived of parental support or care by reason of the unemployment of the natural or adoptive father or mother who is the family's principal wage-earner and with whom the children reside.

This material is effective

*PEN AND INK REVISIONS*

*AP Manual. (6 CHSR III), Subchapter A*

The following sections are revised by changing the word "father" to "parent" in the text and a similar change is to be made in any other manual sections which refer to "unemployed father": Sections 301.03, 301.05, 303.05, 303.11, 303.62, 303.64, 303.66, 303.86.

Massachusetts Assistance Payments Manual

AID TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN

(6 CHSR III)

Subchapter A

Rev.

Part 303

Subpart A

Page 303.01

*NEW AND REVISED MATERIAL*

*AP Manual, (6 CHSR III), Subchapter A*

Part 303, Subpart A, Sections 303.01 and 303.04

*OBSOLETE MATERIAL*

*AP Manual, (6 CHSR III), Subchapter A*

Part 303, Subpart A, Section 303.01 — Trans. by S.L. 435  
 Section 303.04 (2 pages) — Trans. by  
 S.L. 407

State Letter

Section 303.01 — *Deprivation of Parental Support or Care* is revised as follows:

A child must be deprived of the support or care of the natural or adoptive father or mother, whether or not the parents are married to each other. "Deprivation" exists because of:

- (A) death of the father or mother
- (B) physical or mental incapacity of the father or mother
- (C) continued absence from home of the father or mother
- (D) unemployment of the family's principal wage-earner

The principal wage-earner is defined as the parent (natural or adoptive father or mother) whose earned income or Unemploy-

## Massachusetts Assistance Payments Manual

## AID TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN

(6 CHSR III)

Subchapter A

Rev.

Part 303

Subpart A

Page 303.01

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ment Compensation was greater during the six (6) calendar months preceeding the month of application, reapplication or redetermination of eligibility. If neither parent worked or received UC during the previous six (6) months, the principal wage-earner is defined as the parent who earned more or received more UC during the period set forth in Section 303.04 - (E).

Section 303.04 — *Unemployed Father* is revised as follows:

303.04 *Unemployment of Principal Wage-Earner*

AFDC is available to a child(ren) deprived of parental support because of the unemployment of the natural or adoptive parent who is the family's principal wage-earner and with whom the child(ren) resides. The parent must meet the following conditions:

- (A) Is currently unemployed (or is employed less than 100 hours a month) and has been unemployed (or was employed less than 100 hours) for at least 30 days prior to the receipt of AFDC, except as provided in the Work Experience Program, Section 303.86.

A parent who has worked a total number of hours that is less than 100 hours in the 30 day period prior to AFDC-UF eligibility meets the standard regardless of whether or not he may have been employed full time at

## Massachusetts Assistance Payments Manual

## AID TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN

(6 CHSR III)  
Subchapter A

Rev.  
Part 303  
Subpart A  
Page 303.04

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some point during this 30 day period. For example, a parent might have two weeks of full time employment (amounting to 80 hours) and then two weeks of total unemployment (amounting to zero hours), and the total hours worked would be less than 100.

The standard of 100 hours a month may be exceeded for a particular month if his work is intermittent and the excess is of a temporary nature as evidenced by the fact that he was under the 100-hour standard for the two (2) prior months and is expected to be under the standard during the next month.

NOTE: Date of eligibility of AFDC will be the thirty-first day of unemployment or underemployment.

- (B) Has applied for any unemployment compensation (UC) benefits to which he may be entitled. The UC benefits when received must be deducted from the AFDC grant. (See Section 303.58 regarding retroactive UC benefits)
- (C) Has not refused without good cause a bona fide offer of suitable employment or training for employment within thirty (30) days prior to eligibility for AFDC-UF.

Before it is determined that a parent has refused a bona fide offer of employment or training for employment

## Massachusetts Assistance Payments Manual

## AID TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN

(6 CHSR III)

Subchapter A

Rev.

Part 303

Subpart A

Page 303.01

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without good cause, the worker must first make a determination that such an offer was actually made.

When a job is a bona fide offer made directly by an employer, the determination of good cause is to be made by the worker. In making this determination, the worker shall give consideration to such factors as the ability and physical capacity of the individual to do the job; transportation problems to and from the job; applicable minimum wages; risks to health, safety or lack of workmen's compensation protection or other factors that would make refusing a job reasonable.

The determination as to whether an offer was bona fide or whether there was good cause to refuse an offer made through DES will be made by that agency.

(D) Is registered with the WIN program

(a) *Initial Registration*

WIN registration is verified by the applicant's WIN Referral and Registration form (WIN #1) signed by the DES/WIN interviewer.

(b) *Current Registration*

Registration for WIN services shall be current in ongoing AFDC-UF cases provided that the unemployed parent has not been WIN Deregistered.



## Massachusetts Assistance Payments Manual

## AID TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN

(6 CHSR III)

Subchapter A

Rev.

Part 303

Subpart A

Page 303.01

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(E) The unemployed parent must fall into one of the following categories in order to be eligible:

- (a) Has six or more quarters of work in which he received earnings of not less than \$50.00 in each quarter, or participated in a community work and training program or under the Work Incentive Program in any 13 calendar-quarter period ending within one year prior to the application for AFDC; or
  - (b) Received UC under an unemployment compensation law of any state or of the United States at sometime during the year prior to application for AFDC; or
  - (c) Was qualified to receive UC under a UC law of any state or of the United States sometime during the year prior to application for AFDC but did not apply for UC; or
  - (d) Performed work not covered by UC, which if covered would have created eligibility for UC within one year prior to the application for AFDC.
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**Appendix C.**

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS**

**CINDY AND WILLIAM WESTCOTT ET AL.**

**v.**

**CIVIL ACTION  
No. 77-222-F**

**JOSEPH A. CALIFANO ET AL.**

**Order.**

*July 19, 1978.*

**FREEDMAN, D.J.**

The motion of the state defendant Sharp for extension of the Court's stay of its Order of April 20, 1978 with respect to those families where one person remains employed for 100 or more hours per month, which motion was filed on July 7, 1978, is hereby **ALLOWED**.

With respect to the state defendant's motion to clarify or modify the Court's Order of April 20, 1978, filed on June 7, 1978, the Court hereby takes same under advisement. All parties are hereby given an additional ten (10) days from this date to submit any further memoranda or supporting documents. The Court intends to rule on this motion at an early date.

**FRANK H. FREEDMAN,**  
*United States District Judge.*

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**Appendix D.**

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS**

**CINDY AND WILLIAM WESTCOTT ET AL.**

**v.**

**CIVIL ACTION  
No. 77-222-F**

**JOSEPH A. CALIFANO ET AL.**

**Order.**

*August 9, 1978.*

**FREEDMAN, D.J.**

Having considered the memoranda and relevant supporting papers submitted by the parties in the above entitled action, this Court hereby denies the motion of the state defendant Alexander Sharp "to clarify or, alternatively, to amend the Court's order of April 20, 1978," which motion was filed on June 7, 1978.

I believe that any reformulation of the statutory scheme embodying the AFDC-U program, which goes beyond the remedy already ordered in this case, is properly left to Congressional action. See *Stevens v. Califano*, No. 77-103A, slip op. at 23 n. 11 (N.D. Ohio, April 19, 1978). Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has most recently reiterated the principle that "states are not free to narrow the federal standards that define the categories of people eligible for aid" under the AFDC program, *Quern v. Mandley*, 46 U.S.L.W. 4594, 4598

(U.S. June 6, 1978).<sup>1</sup> This Court, therefore, cannot authorize the imposition of an eligibility criterion, such as a primary wage earner criterion, on the awarding of AFDC-U and/or Medicaid benefits by the defendant Sharp under the Massachusetts regulations, 6 CHSR III, Subch. A, Pt. 301, § 301.03; Pt. 303, Subpt. A, §§ 303.01 & 303.04.

It is so ordered.

FRANK H. FREEDMAN,  
*United States District Judge.*

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<sup>1</sup>The Court indicated, albeit by way of implication, that the optional AFDC-U program is to be treated in the same way as the AFDC program at least with respect to the application of this principle. See *Quern v. Mandley*, *supra* at 4599 & n. 18.

**Appendix E.**

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS**

**CINDY AND WILLIAM WESTCOTT, ET AL.,  
PLAINTIFFS**

**v.**

**CIVIL ACTION  
No. 77-222-F**

**JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, ET AL.,  
DEFENDANTS**

**Notice of Appeal.**


Defendant Sharp gives notice of his appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252 and 2101 from the Order of the District Court entered in this action on August 9, 1978.

By his attorney,  
**PAUL W. JOHNSON**  
Assistant Attorney General  
Government Bureau  
One Ashburton Place  
Boston, Massachusetts 02108  
(617) 727-1038

**Dated: August 23, 1978**

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No. 78-689



**In the Supreme Court of the United States**

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

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ALEXANDER SHARP, II, COMMISSIONER OF THE  
MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF  
PUBLIC WELFARE, APPELLANT

v.

CINDY WESTCOTT, ET AL.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE FEDERAL APPELLEE

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WADE H. MCCREE, JR.  
*Solicitor General*  
*Department of Justice*  
*Washington, D.C. 20530*

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**In the Supreme Court of the United States**

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

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No. 78-689

ALEXANDER SHARP, II, COMMISSIONER OF THE  
MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF  
PUBLIC WELFARE, APPELLANT

v.

CINDY WESTCOTT, ET AL.

---

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE FEDERAL APPELLEE

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**STATEMENT**

Appellant does not contest the merits of the district court's decision holding Section 407 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 607, unconstitutional. That decision is the subject of the Secretary's appeal in *Califano v. Westcott*, No. 78-437. Appellant seeks review only of the district court's subsequent refusal to amend its remedial order.



1. The district court held that Section 407 of the Social Security Act, which provides benefits to two-parent families in which a dependent child has been deprived of parental support because of the unemployment of his father but does not provide benefits when the mother is unemployed,<sup>1</sup> violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. It also concluded that the implementing Massachusetts regulations violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Finally, the district court concluded that the proper remedy is the extension of the AFDC-UF program to all families with needy dependent children where either parent is unemployed within the meaning of the Act and implementing regulations. Accordingly it enjoined appellant from refusing to grant AFDC-UF benefits to families with children deprived of parental support by reason of the unemployment of the mother under the same standards as appellant provides benefits to families in which the father is unemployed. The court also enjoined the enforcement of Section 407 insofar as it prohibited the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare from approving a Massachusetts AFDC plan or the payment of federal matching funds to Massachusetts families eligible for AFDC benefits but for the fact that the mother rather than the father is unemployed.

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<sup>1</sup> The Aid to Families With Dependent Children—Unemployed Father (AFDC-UF) program is more fully described in our jurisdictional statement in *Califano v. Westcott*, *supra*, at 2-4.

2. Appellant moved for clarification or modification of the district court's order to permit the adoption of a state plan providing benefits only to families with dependent children who were deprived of parental support by reason of the unemployment of the parent who had been the principal wage-earner.

On August 9, 1978, the district court declined to amend its order, concluding (J.S. App. 13a) that any further reformulation of the statutory scheme beyond deletion of the gender distinction was a matter for Congress, and that the State of Massachusetts was "not free to narrow the federal standards that define the categories of people eligible for aid" under the AFDC program," quoting *Quern v. Mandley*, No. 76-1159 (June 6, 1978), slip op. 15.

#### ARGUMENT

Appellant contends that the district court erred in refusing to authorize the State to adopt an AFDC-UF plan limiting benefits to families in which the primary wage-earner is unemployed. He urges (J.S. 12-17) that the legislative history of Section 407 demonstrates that Congress intended to provide aid to children in families in which the breadwinner was unemployed, and that an unqualified extension of Section 407 to families where either parent is unemployed would broaden the AFDC program beyond Congress' intent. Appellant also urges (J.S. 17-19) that the district court failed to consider the greatly increased cost of extending AFDC benefits to families where either parent is unemployed, which, appellant argues,

supports the view that Congress would respond to the deletion of the gender distinction in Section 407 by limiting benefits to families where the primary wage-earner is unemployed.

These arguments do not warrant plenary review by this Court. The district court properly concluded (J.S. App. 13a) that appellant may not adopt a plan that would "‘narrow the federal standards that define the categories of people eligible for aid’ under the AFDC program," quoting *Quern v. Mandley*, *supra*, slip op. 15. See *Burns v. Alcala*, 420 U.S. 575, 578 (1975); *Townsend v. Swank*, 404 U.S. 282, 286 (1971); *King v. Smith*, 392 U.S. 309, 333 n.34 (1968).

Section 407(a) gives the Secretary, not the states, the authority to set standards for the unemployment necessary to make a family eligible for AFDC benefits. It defines the term "dependent child" to include "a needy child who meets the requirements of [42 U.S.C. 606(a)(2)] who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the unemployment (as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary) of his father \* \* \*." The regulations adopted by the Secretary do not give the states the option of limiting their plans to families where the primary wage-earner is unemployed; these regulations require each state to adopt a definition of an unemployed father that "must include any father" who meets certain stated requirements. 45 C.F.R. 233.100(a)(1).

Because the district court did not purport to restrict the Secretary's authority to define "unemployment" in any gender-neutral way, or to prevent any state dissatisfied with the federal standards to withdraw from this portion of the AFDC program, the district court's order of August 9, 1978, is correct.

### CONCLUSION

The Court should defer consideration of this appeal pending its decision in *Califano v. Westcott*, No. 78-437. If it affirms the judgment in No. 78-437, then it should affirm the order challenged here as well. If it reaches any other conclusion in No. 78-437, then it should dispose of this appeal as appropriate in light of the disposition of No. 78-437.

Respectfully submitted.

WADE H. MCCREE, JR.  
*Solicitor General*

NOVEMBER 1978

JAN 29 1979

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

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**In the  
Supreme Court of the United States**

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-689

**ALEXANDER SHARP, II,  
COMMISSIONER OF THE MASSACHUSETTS  
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE,  
APPELLANT,  
v.  
CINDY WESTCOTT, ET AL.,  
APPELLEES.**

**ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS**

**Brief for the Appellant**

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## Table of Contents.

Opinions below	1
Jurisdiction	2
Statutory provision involved	3
Question presented	3
Statement	4
Summary of argument	9
Argument	11
A sex-neutral AFDC-UF program must, as a matter of federal law, condition eligibility upon the unemployment of the family's principal wage-earner	11
A. The separation of powers principle supports the Commissioner's argument	11
B. Section 407's legislative history demonstrates the propriety of the principal wage-earner model of the AFDC-UF program	14
C. Section 407's structure substantiates the correctness of the principal wage-earner model of the AFDC-UF program	27
D. The District Court improperly failed to assess the comparative costs of the alternative remedies as an index of how Congress itself would have chosen to correct section 407's underinclusiveness	34
E. The present availability of AFDC-UF benefits to families where the mother is fully employed does not require the adoption of the dual wage-earner model of the AFDC-UF program	37
Conclusion	41

## Table of Authorities Cited.

## CASES.

Armstrong v. Candon, 451 F. Supp. 1148 (D. Vt. 1978)	31n
Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977)	4, 5,
Burr v. Smith, 322 F. Supp. 980 (W.D. Wash. 1971)	29n
Carroll v. Finch, 326 F. Supp. 891 (D. Alaska 1971)	28n, 29n
Cheley v. Burson, 324 F. Supp. 678 (N.D. Ga. 1971), app. dismd. sub nom. Cheley v. Parnham, 404 U.S. 878 (1971)	30n
Coon v. Ohio Department of Public Welfare, No. C 75-925 (N.D. Ohio March 1, 1976)	30n, 38, 39n
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Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963)	13n
Hart v. Juras, 17 Or. App. 566, 522 P. 2d 1399 (Or. App. 1974)	30n
Henry v. Betit, 323 F. Supp. 418 (D. Alaska 1971)	31n
Jablon v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 399 F. Supp. 118 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 430 U.S. 924 (1977)	35
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968)	4, 20n
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McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U.S. 21 (1975)	3
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# TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED.

iii

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Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707 (1975)	5n
Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725 (1978)	11, 36
Schneider v. McNutt, C.A. No. 213-75C3 (W.D. Wash. March 28, 1977)	23
Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251 (1974)	27n, 28n
Stevens v. Califano, 448 F. Supp. 1313 (N.D. Ohio 1978), appeal docketed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3227 (1978) (No. 78-449, 1978 Term)	24, 30n, 37, 38, 40n
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971)	13n
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United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960)	3
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970)	7, 10, 12n, 26n, 37n

## CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS.

United States Constitution	
Fifth Amendment	6
Fourteenth Amendment	6
Massachusetts Constitution, Amend. Art. 106	6n
28 U.S.C. (1976)	
§ 1252	2, 3
§ 1331	6
§ 1343	6

42 U.S.C. (1976)	
§ 406(e)	36
§§ 601 et seq.	4
§ 602	4
§ 602(a)(7)	28n, 29n
§ 602(a)(8)	29n
§ 603	4, 35n
§ 607	1, 2, 3
§ 607(a)	27n
§ 607(b)(1)(A)	27n
§ 607(b)(1)(B)	27n
§ 607(b)(1)(C)	27n
§ 1396a(a)(10)	4, 35n
Social Security Act of 1935	4, 20n
§ 407	3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11 et seq.
Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No.	
87-543, § 131(a), 76 Stat. 193 (1962)	21n
Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 882 (1968)	5
§ 202(b)	32n
§ 203(a)	22n, 27n
49 Stat. 627-29 (1935)	4
75 Stat. 75 (1961)	5, 21

## REGULATIONS.

45 C.F.R. (1977)	
§ 233.20(a)(2)(i)	28n
§ 233.20(a)(3)(i)	31n
§ 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D)	28n
§ 233.20(a)(3)(iv)	29n
§ 233.20(a)(3)(iv)(a)	28n
§ 233.20(a)(7)	29n

# TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED.

v

§ 233.20(a)(7)(ii)	29n, 32n
§ 233.20(a)(11)	29n
§ 233.90(c)(1)(iv)	5n
§ 233.100(a)(1)	27n
§ 233.100(a)(1)(i)	27n, 31, 38n
§ 233.100(a)(3)(iii)	27n
6 Mass. CHSR III, Subch. A	
Pt. 301, § 301.03	5n
Pt. 303, Subpt. A, § 303.01	5n
Pt. 303, Subpt. A, § 303.04	5n
Pt. 303, Subpt. A, § 303.21-22	31n
Pt. 304, Subpt. D, § 304.215	31n
Pt. 304, Subpt. D, § 304.218	31n

## LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS.

107 Congressional Record (1961)	
1795	19n
2941	17n
3759	17n, 19n, 29n, 34n
3761	19n
3761-64	17n
3763-64	19n
3765	40n
3766	19n
3767	25n
3767-68	19n
3768	19n
3769	19n
3769-70	17n
3770	19n
3770-71	17n

3771	19n
6401	19n
108 Congressional Record (1962)	
1187	21n
4272	21n
4282	21n
12513	21n
12661	22n
13871-72	22n
13879	22n
14139	21n
113 Congressional Record (1967)	
33193-95	26n
33195	26n
33630	37n
36358	26n
36785	27n
36817	26n, 34n
36914	23n
H.R. 3864, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961)	16n, 17n, 20n
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H.R. Rep. No. 27, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961)	20n
H.R. Rep. No. 28, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961)	5n, 19n, 29n
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H.R. Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967)	22n, 26n, 27n, 32n
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vii

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**In the  
Supreme Court of the United States**

**1      OCTOBER TERM, 1978**

**No. 78-689**

**ALEXANDER SHARP, II,  
COMMISSIONER OF THE MASSACHUSETTS  
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE,  
APPELLANT,**

**v.**

**CINDY WESTCOTT, ET AL.,  
APPELLEES.**

**ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS**

**Opinions Below**

**The opinion of the District Court (Fed. J.S. App. 1A-37A)  
which accompanied its order of April 20, 1978 (Fed. J.S. App.  
39A-42A), declaring 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1976) unconstitutional**

in part, is not yet reported.<sup>1</sup> The District Court's order of August 9, 1978 (State J.S. App. 13a-14a), is not reported.<sup>2</sup>

### Jurisdiction

On April 20, 1978, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts entered an order declaring unconstitutional and enjoining the enforcement of a portion of 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1976) (Fed. J.S. App. 39A-42A). The Secretary of the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (Secretary) and the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare (Commissioner) were defendants in that action. On May 18, 1978, the Secretary filed a notice of his appeal to this Court from that order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976) (Fed. J.S. App. 43A-44A).

The District Court's initial order also required the Commissioner to reformulate the public assistance program established by 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1976) in order to correct its underinclusiveness. On June 7, 1978, the Commissioner filed a motion to clarify or, alternatively, to amend the District Court's order of April 20, 1978, in order to obtain a definitive ruling from the District Court on whether his proposed plan to correct the underinclusiveness of 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1976) was a permissible remedy (State J.S. App. 3a-11a). On August 9, 1978, the District Court denied the Commissioner's motion on its merits (State J.S. App. 13a-14a). On August 24, 1978, the Commissioner filed a notice of his appeal from that final order to this

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<sup>1</sup> This brief will refer to the elements of the record reprinted in the appendix to the jurisdictional statement in the consolidated case of *Califano v. Westcott*, No. 78-437, as: (Fed. J.S. App. ).

<sup>2</sup> This brief will refer to the elements of the record reprinted in the appendix to the jurisdictional statement in this case as: (State J.S. App. ).



Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976) (State J.S. App. 15a). The Commissioner filed his jurisdictional statement on October 23, 1978. This Court noted probable jurisdiction on December 11, 1978, and consolidated this case with the Secretary's appeal in *Califano v. Westcott*, No. 78-437 (A. 66).

Where one party has previously appealed to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976) from a decision holding an act of Congress unconstitutional, section 1252 provides that:

A party who has received notice of appeal under this section shall take any subsequent appeal or cross appeal to the Supreme Court.

Cases supporting this Court's jurisdiction include *McLucas v. DeChamplain*, 421 U.S. 21 (1975), and *United States v. Raines*, 362 U.S. 17 (1960).

### Statutory Provision Involved

The validity of section 407 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1976) (Fed. J.S. App. 45A-48A), and Massachusetts' implementing regulations (A. 22-26) is involved. The text of section 407 is set forth at pages 653-654 of volume 10 of the United States Code (1976). The text of the challenged portions of Massachusetts' Code of Human Services Regulations (CHSR) appears in Mass. Reg. Special Issue No. 8 at pp. 11 and 22 (1976) and Mass. Reg. Issue No. 41 at pp. 60-61 (1977).

### Question Presented

Whether the District Court selected an improper remedy for sex discrimination when it ordered that public assistance

which had previously been available to a two-parent family only if the father were unemployed must be extended to such families if either parent were unemployed, thereby rejecting the more limited sex-neutral remedy of extending assistance to only those families whose principal wage-earner was unemployed.

### Statement

The Social Security Act of 1935 (Act) established the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, as it is now known, to provide financial assistance to families whose children were needy because of the death, absence or incapacity of a parent. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 *et seq.* (1976) (originally enacted by 49 Stat. 627-629 (1935)). The Congressional purpose behind the AFDC program was to have the federal and state governments assume financial responsibility for "children in families without a 'breadwinner,' 'wage earner,' or 'father,'" *King v. Smith*, 392 U.S. 309, 328 (1968), in order "to allow widows and divorced mothers to care for their children at home without having to go to work." *Batterton v. Francis*, 432 U.S. 416, 418 (1977). Under the program, the Secretary determines whether the plan of a state electing to participate in AFDC meets the standards set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1976). If so, that state is entitled to receive partial federal reimbursement for both the cost of the benefits which it provides and its administrative costs. 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1976). If a state also elects to participate in the medical assistance (Medicaid) program established under the Act, individuals receiving AFDC benefits are automatically entitled to receive Medicaid benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (1976).

In 1961, Congress expanded the AFDC program "to assist children who are needy simply because the family breadwinner is unable to find work." *Batterton v. Francis*, 432 U.S. 416, 419 (1977).<sup>3</sup> Congress undertook this expansion by adding section 407 to the Act. 75 Stat. 75 (1961). As subsequently amended by 81 Stat. 882 (1968), section 407 redefined the class of eligible families to include those whose children were needy simply because of their father's unemployment.<sup>4</sup> This supplementary component of the AFDC program is known as the Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Unemployed Father (AFDC-UF) program. All requirements of the AFDC program (other than the requisite death, absence, or incapacity of a parent) apply to the AFDC-UF program.<sup>5</sup> Along with approximately one-half of the states,<sup>6</sup> Massachusetts has elected to participate in the AFDC-UF program.<sup>7</sup> In conformity with section 407, Massachusetts has defined eligibility for its AFDC-UF program in terms of the unemployment of the father.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> See also H.R. Rep. No. 28, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1961); S. Rep. No. 165, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1961), reprinted in [1961] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1716, 1717.

<sup>4</sup> This Court has reviewed the development of the AFDC-UF program in *Philbrook v. Glodgett*, 421 U.S. 707, 709-711 (1975), and *Batterton v. Francis*, 432 U.S. 416, 419-420 (1977).

<sup>5</sup> In short, AFDC-UF provides to certain intact (i.e., two-parent) families what AFDC provides to families with only one parent (or two parents where one is incapacitated) in the home. For purposes of AFDC eligibility, an incapacitated parent is one whose physical or mental ability to provide parental care has been substantially reduced. 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(1)(iv) (1977). The administrative structure of the AFDC-UF program is explained more fully *infra* at 27-34.

<sup>6</sup> *Batterton v. Francis*, 432 U.S. 416, 420 (1977).

<sup>7</sup> 6 Mass. CHSR III, Subch. A, Pt. 301, § 301.03 [Mass. Reg. Special Issue No. 8 at 11 (1976)] and Subch. A, Pt. 303, Subpt. A, § 303.04 [Mass. Reg. Issue No. 41 at 60-61 (1977)].

<sup>8</sup> 6 Mass. CHSR III, Subch. A, Pt. 303, Subpt. A, § 303.01 [Mass. Reg. Special Issue No. 8 at 22 (1976)].

In January, 1977, plaintiffs filed this class action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 (1976) in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts asserting that section 407 and the implementing state regulations violated their equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment respectively (A. 17-18).<sup>9</sup> Plaintiffs argued that the statutory classification was fatally underinclusive because it failed to provide AFDC-UF benefits on the basis of the mother's unemployment in a family which was otherwise identical to an eligible family. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the continued enforcement of section 407 and the state regulations (A. 19-20).

Plaintiffs moved for certification of their class and for summary judgment on their federal constitutional claims. The Secretary opposed their summary judgment motion on the merits, but at the same time argued that the proper remedy, should one be needed, was to extend, rather than strike down, the AFDC-UF program. The Commissioner adopted the Secretary's arguments in defense of section 407, and went on to argue independently in favor of extension of the AFDC-UF program. On April 20, 1978, the District Court certified a class consisting of all families within Massachusetts which would be eligible for the AFDC-UF program but for its exclusion of families in need because of the mother's unemployment (Fed. J.S. App. 39A-40A). On the merits, the court ruled that the statutory classification was invalid as underinclusive (Fed. J.S. App. 33A). It then addressed the question of how, as a matter of remedy, to cure the underinclusiveness of the AFDC-UF program. In accordance with Justice Harlan's

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<sup>9</sup>Plaintiffs additionally challenged the validity of Massachusetts' regulations implementing the AFDC-UF program under the state constitutional provision that "[e]quality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex . . ." (A. 18-19). See Mass. Const., amend. art. 106.

seminal opinion concurring in *Welsh v. United States*, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), the District Court recognized that it had "two remedial choices: elimination of the AFDC-U subprogram altogether because of its constitutional imperfection or extension of AFDC-U . . . benefits to those persons previously unconstitutionally excluded" (Fed. J.S. App. 34A).<sup>10</sup> It accordingly set out to decide "'whether it more nearly accords with Congress' wishes to eliminate its policy altogether or extend it in order to render what Congress plainly did intend, constitutional,'" citing Justice Harlan's opinion in *Welsh*, 398 U.S. at 355-356 (Fed. J.S. App. 34A). Upon its decision to extend the AFDC-UF program to the plaintiff class, the District Court ordered the Commissioner "to grant AFDC and Medicaid benefits to families with children deprived of support or care because of the unemployment of the mother in the same amounts and under the same standards as he provides such benefits to families deprived of support or care because of the unemployment of the father . . ." (Fed. J.S. App. 41A-42A). The District Court also enjoined the Secretary from the enforcement of section 407 "insofar as it prohibits defendant Califano from approving a Massachusetts plan or federal matching funds for Massachusetts to pay AFDC or Medicaid benefits to families deprived of support or care due to the unemployment of the mother" (Fed. J.S. App. 40A-41A). The operative effect of these orders was to place upon the Commissioner rather than the Secretary the responsibility for designing a valid sex-neutral AFDC-UF program.

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<sup>10</sup> In his concurring opinion in *Welsh v. United States*, 398 U.S. at 361, Justice Harlan had declared that:

Where a statute is defective because of underinclusion there exist two remedial alternatives: a court may either declare it a nullity and order that its benefits not extend to the class that the legislature intended to benefit, or it may extend the coverage of the statute to include those who are aggrieved by exclusion.

On May 10, 1978, the Commissioner moved for a partial stay of the court's initial order until August 1, 1978, to allow him to develop and implement a plan for compliance with that order (A. 43-48). In that motion, he indicated his intention to consider whether the unemployment of a family's principal wage-earner could validly become the standard of eligibility in a sex-neutral AFDC-UF program (A. 44). While granting the requested stay, the District Court did, at plaintiffs' urging, point out in its order of May 31, 1978, that its original order did not "contain any language which authorizes the imposition of . . . a primary wage earner limitation . . . on the awarding of AFDC-UF and/or Medicaid benefits by the defendant Sharp" (State J.S. App. 2a). In order to resolve whether the District Court's original order required him to provide AFDC-UF benefits to families upon the unemployment of either parent regardless of the employment status of the other parent (the *dual wage-earner model* of the AFDC-UF program) or only upon the unemployment of the family's principal wage-earner (the *principal wage-earner model* of the AFDC-UF program), the Commissioner then moved the District Court to clarify or, alternatively, to amend its initial order to permit the provision of AFDC-UF benefits only to families deprived of support by the principal wage-earner's unemployment (State J.S. App. 3a-11a).<sup>11</sup> Plaintiffs opposed this motion. On July 19, 1978, the District Court extended its stay of its initial order until October 1, 1978, so that it could

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<sup>11</sup> As an appendix to his motion to clarify or, alternatively, to amend the District Court's order of April 20, 1978, the Commissioner attached a proposed amendment to the state AFDC-UF regulations which redefined eligibility in terms of deprivation caused by the unemployment of the family's principal wage-earner. In pertinent part, the proposed amendment defined the principal wage-earner as that parent whose earnings were greater during the six months preceding the month of application, reapplication or redetermination of eligibility (State J.S. App. 6a-11a).



give further consideration to the Commissioner's motion. It also permitted the parties to submit further documents supporting their respective positions on the principal wage-earner issue (State J.S. App. 12a). Plaintiffs advocated the dual wage-earner model on the ground that, as the father's unemployment had previously been sufficient to establish eligibility, the mother's unemployment should now similarly be sufficient to establish eligibility under a sex-neutral AFDC-UF program regardless of the father's concurrent employment. The Secretary remained silent on this issue.

On August 9, 1978, the District Court denied the Commissioner's motion to clarify or, alternatively, to amend its order of April 20, 1978. Its reasons were that: (1) any reformulation of the AFDC-UF program that would go beyond its initial order should be left to Congress, and (2) it could not authorize Massachusetts to narrow the federal standard of eligibility for the AFDC-UF program (State J.S. App. 13a-14a). By its refusal to adopt the principal wage-earner model of the AFDC-UF program, the District Court necessarily approved the remedy advanced by the plaintiffs. Accordingly, on August 24, 1978, the Commissioner filed his notice of appeal on the issue of remedy (State J.S. App. 15a).

### Summary of Argument

This appeal presents a narrow but significant issue of remedy. As written by Congress, section 407 provides assistance to a needy family whose father has a work history but is unemployed. If section 407's failure to provide assistance to a needy family whose mother is similarly unemployed is held unconstitutional, the remedial issue is what form of a sex-neutral AFDC-UF program, if any, would

Congress have established if it had known of section 407's underinclusiveness when it enacted that statute. *See Welsh v. United States*, 398 U.S. 333, 355-367 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). The proper remedy is that which produces a sex-neutral AFDC-UF program consonant with section 407's legislative history and administrative framework.

As evidenced by legislative history, the wholly proper rationale behind section 407 was to include a two-parent family in AFDC if, and only if, its principal wage-earner were unemployed. Congress meant to assist families whose need was occasioned by their breadwinners' temporary loss of employment. The improper sex stereotype, as found by the District Court, lay in section 407's unyielding definition of the family breadwinner as the father (Fed. J.S. App. 29A-31A). If that stereotype is stricken from the law, what remains is a program to aid families whose principal wage-earner, whether male or female, is unemployed.

Examined under the light of legislative history, the District Court's remedy is revealed as too broad. Its dual wage-earner model of eligibility produces an open-ended expansion of the AFDC-UF program going far beyond what Congress intended. Since either parent's unemployment would trigger assistance, a family could receive assistance as long as either parent (rather than just the principal wage-earning parent) remained unemployed. After such a family had once established its eligibility, it could by virtue of federal law remain eligible until its annual gross income equaled — for example — \$16,340 for an average family of five. As a result, the dual wage-earner model would indefinitely supplement the income of a large number of families that are not needy by conventional standards. For this reason, the District Court's remedy overreaches Congress' conception of AFDC-UF as a temporary supplement to families impoverished by their breadwinners' unemployment.



In choosing between these proposed alternative remedies, the District Court ignored their comparative costs as an index of how Congress itself would have elected to cure section 407's underinclusiveness. The dual wage-earner model would add \$23,000,000 in AFDC benefits to the annual cost of Massachusetts' AFDC-UF program, which stood at \$30,000,000 prior to the District Court's ruling. By contrast, the principal wage-earner model would add only \$3,300,000. The fiscal ramifications of the dual wage-earner model indicate that it is not the alternative most reflective of Congressional intent. See *Quern v. Mandley*, 436 U.S. 725, 745-746 (1978).

The principal wage-earner model is consistent with past practice under the AFDC-UF program of conditioning eligibility upon the father's unemployment regardless of the mother's employment. The goal of the principal wage-earner model is simply to condition eligibility upon the unemployment of that parent who is in fact the family breadwinner, regardless of the other parent's employment status.

### Argument

A SEX-NEUTRAL AFDC-UF PROGRAM MUST, AS A MATTER OF FEDERAL LAW, CONDITION ELIGIBILITY UPON THE UNEMPLOYMENT OF THE FAMILY'S PRINCIPAL WAGE-EARNER.

#### A. *The Separation of Powers Principle Supports the Commissioner's Argument.*

The Commissioner's motion to clarify or, alternatively, to amend the District Court's order of April 20, 1978, presented a single question: whether the legislative history and statutory framework of the AFDC-UF program dictated the replace-

ment of the invalid term "father" by a sex-neutral reference to the family's principal wage-earner as the parent whose unemployment can establish eligibility under section 407 (State J.S. App. 3a-5a). Three precepts of the federal common law of remedies govern the answer to that question. First, the judiciary may extend a statutory classification to cure its underinclusiveness only where Congress would itself have elected to do so. The judiciary's power is limited to rendering "what Congress plainly did intend . . . constitutional."<sup>12</sup> In this case, the Court must determine what form of a sex-neutral AFDC-UF program, if any, Congress would have established if it had known of section 407's constitutional defect when it enacted that statute.<sup>13</sup> Second, the judiciary should only "hazard the necessary statutory repairs if they can be made within the administrative framework of the statute and without impairing other legislative goals . . ."<sup>14</sup> In sum, the Congressional intent underlying a statutory classification and its administrative structure determine the form which judicial extension must take.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> *Welsh v. United States*, 398 U.S. 333, 356 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).

<sup>13</sup> See Note, *Extension Versus Invalidation of Underinclusive Statutes: A Remedial Alternative*, 12 Colum. J.L. and Soc. Probs. 115, 121-122 (1975).

<sup>14</sup> *Welsh v. United States*, 398 U.S. 333, 366 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Elsewhere in his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan accordingly cautioned that:

[I]t is, of course, necessary to . . . consider the degree of potential disruption that would occur by extension as opposed to abrogation. 398 U.S. at 365.

<sup>15</sup> When the District Court selected the dual wage-earner model over the principal wage-earner model, it observed that Massachusetts could not restrict the federal definition of eligibility for the AFDC-UF program (State J.S. App. 13a-14a). This observation reflected a misunderstanding of the Commissioner's position. The Commissioner had, rather, argued — and

These two precepts for the remedial extension of a legislative classification stem from the constitutional principle of separation of powers. To extend a statutory class without a strong showing of tacit Congressional approval would ignore the basic tenet that legislatures, not courts, are elected to make laws.<sup>16</sup> A third outgrowth of that fundamental principle is the well-established maxim — applied recently in this Court's desegregation decisions — that a remedy ought not to exceed the scope of the constitutional violation which it cures.<sup>17</sup> The

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argues now — that a sex-neutral AFDC-UF program must, as a matter of federal law, adhere to the principal wage-earner model when it discards section 407's sex stereotypes. The District Court's parallel observation that any further reformulation of the AFDC-UF program should be left to Congress is, therefore, similarly inapposite.

<sup>16</sup> See *Ferguson v. Skrupa*, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963). Accord, *Moss v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare*, 408 F. Supp. 403 (M.D. Fla. 1976), where the three-judge District Court sustained an equal protection challenge to a provision of the Social Security Act requiring husbands, but not wives, to demonstrate dependency in order to obtain certain benefits. The court declined, however, to extend the benefit of this underinclusive provision on the ground that:

Any enlargement in the coverage of the Act, necessitating an immense increase in governmental expenditure, would effectively exercise a power reserved exclusively to Congress by the Constitution; and a judicial selection of that remedy in this case would clearly impinge upon the constitutional concept of separation of powers.

*Id.*, 414. The District Court elected, therefore, to require both husbands and wives to demonstrate dependency in order to obtain the benefits. See also Frug, *The Judicial Power of the Purse*, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 715, 749-750 (1978).

<sup>17</sup> *Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler*, 427 U.S. 424, 433-437 (1976) (court's remedial power extends only as far as necessary to eradicate constitutional violations found to exist); *Milliken v. Bradley*, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (desegregation remedy could not lawfully be imposed beyond the municipal boundaries within which segregation had been shown to occur); see *Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education*, 402 U.S. 1, 16

judiciary may, therefore, properly exercise its remedial power only so far as is necessary to right the wrong before it.

Viewed from this perspective, the principal wage-earner model of the AFDC-UF program is the superior remedy for section 407's underinclusiveness. By comparison with the open-ended expansion of the AFDC-UF program which plaintiffs advocate, it constitutes a moderate remedy in harmony with the contours of both the legislative history underlying section 407 and its administrative structure. The principal wage-earner model is also a complete remedy because it would provide assistance to families on the basis of the unemployment of male and female breadwinners alike. The principal wage-earner model should, therefore, be adopted because it does not, unlike the dual wage-earner model, exceed the scope of the sex-discriminatory defect in section 407 which it would cure.

*B. Section 407's Legislative History Demonstrates the Propriety of the Principal Wage-Earner Model of the AFDC-UF Program.*

The very legislative intent behind section 407 which, in the view of the District Court (Fed. J.S. App. 34A-37A), empowered it to recast the AFDC-UF program in a sex-neutral form also required the District Court to condition eligibility upon the unemployment of the family's principal wage-earner. Section 407 represents Congress' extension of the

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(1971) (task of federal court is to correct the condition that offends the Constitution); cf. *Milliken v. Bradley*, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (broad remedy in desegregation case upheld; although court went beyond student assignment for desegregation purposes and ordered remedial educational programs, the result was deemed justified by the need to compensate for pervasive effects of past segregation).

original AFDC program to two-parent families. This departure from the single-parent model of AFDC was significant in concept but relatively limited in scope. Its goal was to alleviate the plight of families whose breadwinner had become unemployed. Section 407's gender-based limitation reflected Congress' assumption that the principal wage-earners whose unemployment would impoverish families were fathers, not mothers.

Congress did not intend to permit the unemployment of either parent to trigger assistance regardless of the other parent's employment status. Such a dual wage-earner model of the AFDC-UF program would work a fundamental change in this nation's system of public assistance because it would aid two-parent families even if the unemployed parent had only been a casual member of the labor force. AFDC-UF would then provide a guaranteed annual income to all needy families, including the so-called working poor — those families where the principal wage-earner is employed, but at such a low wage that the family remains financially eligible for assistance. In this guise, the AFDC-UF program would no longer serve just to tide families over the temporary need occasioned by the breadwinner's unemployment. It would instead furnish an indefinite — perhaps permanent — supplement to the low wages earned by a family's principal wage-earner. Nothing could be further from Congress' intent, as shown below.

In his State of the Union Message of January 30, 1961, President John F. Kennedy announced that:

The present state of our economy is disturbing. . . . Of some 5½ million Americans who are without jobs, more than 1 million have been searching for work for more than 4 months. And during each month some 150,000 workers are exhausting their already meager jobless benefit rights. . . .

I will propose to Congress within the next 14 days measures to improve unemployment compensation through temporary increases in duration on a self-supporting basis — to provide more food to the families of the unemployed, and aid to their needy children . . .<sup>18</sup>

On February 2, 1961, President Kennedy amplified his earlier proposals in his Message on Economic Recovery and Growth. After repeating his intention to seek a temporary extension of unemployment benefits, he declared that:

Under the aid to dependent children program, needy children are eligible for assistance if their fathers are deceased, disabled, or family deserters. *In logic and humanity, a child should also be eligible for assistance if his father is a needy unemployed worker — for example, a person who has exhausted unemployment benefits and is not receiving adequate local assistance. . . .*

I recommend that the Congress enact an interim amendment to the aid to dependent children program to include the children of the needy unemployed.<sup>19</sup>

The administration subsequently filed twin bills to extend unemployment compensation and to authorize federal financial participation in aid to dependent children of unemployed parents.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>18</sup>The State of the Union Message, January 30, 1961, *reprinted in* [1961] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 25, 26-27.

<sup>19</sup>President's Message on Economic Recovery and Growth, February 2, 1961, H.R. Doc. 81, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., *reprinted in* [1961] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1028, 1032-33 (emphasis added).

<sup>20</sup>H.R. 3864, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); H.R. 3865, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).



The administration bill (H.R. 3865) proposed to establish an AFDC-UF program for the period from April 1, 1961, to June 30, 1962, which would condition benefits upon "the unemployment of a parent."<sup>21</sup> Its declared purpose was, more specifically, "to make assistance . . . available to needy families in which the *breadwinner* is unemployed."<sup>22</sup> As a supplement to the temporary extension of unemployment insurance, the AFDC-UF program was directed toward "unemployed persons who either do not<sup>23</sup> qualify for unemployment compensation benefits, have exhausted their benefits, or who, due to the size of their families or other special needs, will not receive enough from unemployment compensation to live in health and decency."<sup>23</sup> The joint thrust of these twin programs was thus to relieve the plight of families whose "breadwinners" had been left unemployed by a national recession.<sup>24</sup>

At the hearings on H.R. 3865 before the House Committee on Ways and Means, both the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and the Committee Chairman, Representative Mills (who had sponsored H.R. 3865), expressed their under-

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<sup>21</sup> H.R. 3865, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1961).

<sup>22</sup> H.R. 3865, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1961) (emphasis added).

<sup>23</sup> *Temporary Unemployment Compensation and Aid to Dependent Children of Unemployed Parents: Hearings on H.R. 3864 and H.R. 3865 Before the House Committee on Ways and Means*, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 94 (1961) (statement of Abraham Ribicoff, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare) [hereinafter cited as *1961 Hearings*]. As to the interrelationship of H.R. 3864 and H.R. 3865, see also *1961 Hearings*, at 48 (statement of Hon. Arthur Goldberg, Secretary of Labor).

<sup>24</sup> E.g., 107 Cong. Rec. 2941, 3759 (1961) (remarks of Rep. Lane). See also 107 Cong. Rec. 3761-64 (1961) (remarks of Reps. Perkins and Doyle); 107 Cong. Rec. 3769-70 (1961) (remarks of Rep. Machrowicz); and 107 Cong. Rec. 3770-71 (1961) (remarks of Rep. Ullman).

standing that H.R. 3865 — which was expressly aimed at the families of unemployed breadwinners — authorized the provision of AFDC benefits to families rendered needy by the father's unemployment.<sup>25</sup> Although the language of H.R. 3865 referred simply to the "unemployment of a parent," its

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<sup>25</sup> 1961 *Hearings*, *supra* note 23, at 103-04:

THE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, it would seem that the record can be made a little clearer on what is being suggested in this bill.

What we propose to do in this bill, H.R. 3865, is to amend the section of the Federal law making funds available to States in discharging the responsibilities that the State feels it has with respect to the care of dependent children who are in need?

SECRETARY RIBICOFF. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN. What we are suggesting here is this: that the definition of a dependent child be extended to permit that definition to include as a dependent child a needy child under the age of 18, along with the other things that are set forth in existing law, whose father is unemployed.

SECRETARY RIBICOFF. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN. That is all we are saying?

SECRETARY RIBICOFF. That is all.

THE CHAIRMAN. And we do that because we recognize, as you suggest, and I had this thought in mind in introducing the bill, that children may be just as needy with a father in the household unable to supply income to the family because of lack of work, as those children could be under the existing law with the father leaving the home and letting them qualify then in his absence from the home.

SECRETARY RIBICOFF. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

For further references to the unemployment of the father by Secretary Ribicoff and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, see 1961 *Hearings*, *supra* note 23, at 5, 95, 99, and 101. For similar references by other Committee members, see 1961 *Hearings*, *supra* note 23, at 100.



own sponsors thus understood that AFDC-UF benefits were to be provided in the event of a father's unemployment.

Subsequent legislative history confirms that (1) Congress enacted the AFDC-UF program to aid families with unemployed breadwinners and (2) Congress assumed that these breadwinners were fathers. In their reports recommending the enactment of the AFDC-UF program, the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Finance Committee uniformly stated that the purpose of the AFDC-UF program was to assist needy families "in which the breadwinner is unemployed."<sup>26</sup> During the floor debates in the House, several members of the Committee on Ways and Means similarly emphasized that the goal of the AFDC-UF program was to assist families rendered needy by the unemployment of their "breadwinner."<sup>27</sup> Other Representatives referred interchangeably to "breadwinners,"<sup>28</sup> "wage-earners,"<sup>29</sup> or "fathers"<sup>30</sup> in this regard.

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<sup>26</sup> H.R. Rep. No. 28, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 3 (1961); S. Rep. No. 165, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2-3 (1961), *reprinted in* [1961] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1716, 1717. Witnesses at the hearings on H.R. 3865 before the House Committee on Ways and Means had similarly expressed their understanding that the AFDC-UF program was intended to assist the needy families of unemployed breadwinners. *E.g.*, 1961 *Hearings, supra* note 23, at 211, 227 (statement of John Tramberger on behalf of the American Public Welfare Association) ("breadwinner parent") and at 296, 304 (statement of Nelson Cruikshank on behalf of the AFL-CIO) ("family breadwinners").

<sup>27</sup> 107 Cong. Rec. 3767-68 (1961) (remarks of Rep. Byrnes); 107 Cong. Rec. 3770 (1961) (remarks of Rep. Ullman); 107 Cong. Rec. 3771 (1961) (remarks of Rep. Karsten).

<sup>28</sup> 107 Cong. Rec. 3759 (1961) (remarks of Rep. Lane); 107 Cong. Rec. 3763-64 (1961) (remarks of Rep. Doyle).

<sup>29</sup> 107 Cong. Rec. 3768 (1961) (remarks of Rep. McCormack). See also 107 Cong. Rec. 6401 (1961) (remarks of Sen. McCarthy).

<sup>30</sup> 107 Cong. Rec. 1795, 3761, 3766 (1961) (remarks of Rep. Mills); 107 Cong. Rec. 3769 (1961) (remarks of Rep. Cohelan).

This legislative focus on the unemployment of the breadwinner, whom Congress assumed to be the father, demonstrates that Congress envisioned a principal wage-earner model of the AFDC-UF program. The term "breadwinner" denotes that "member of a family or household whose wages *solely or largely* defray its living expenses."<sup>31</sup> In short, the breadwinner is the family's principal wage-earner.<sup>32</sup> By definition, a family can have only one principal wage-earner. Therefore, although either parent can become the family's breadwinner, the very meaning of that term precludes both parents from simultaneously qualifying as the family breadwinner.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1964) (emphasis added).

<sup>32</sup> The District Court itself recognized that:

The legislators at times during the Congressional debates used the term "father" interchangeably with the terms "bread-winner," "worker" and "wage earner." This usage apparently reflected their belief that the father is generally the *primary wage earner* of the family and the mother the "homemaker" (Fed. J.S. App. 24A at n. 15) (emphasis added).

In *King v. Smith*, 392 U.S. 309, 328 (1968), where this Court reviewed the Congressional debates preceding the establishment of the basic AFDC program by the Social Security Act of 1935, it found that the legislators similarly used the terms "breadwinner," "wage earner," and "father" interchangeably.

<sup>33</sup> The legislative history of H.R. 3864, the companion bill to extend unemployment compensation, indicates that at least certain members of the House Committee on Ways and Means were keenly aware of the concept of a family's principal wage-earner. The Minority Report on the version of H.R. 3864 reported by the Committee criticized the majority for its failure to identify "the unemployed as to whether they are the principal wage earners in their families or are instead supplementary wage earners or even casual members of the labor force." H.R. Rep. No. 27, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1961). In the hearings on H.R. 3864 before the Committee, Representative Alger questioned Secretary of Labor Goldberg at length in an effort to deter-

In 1962, Congress voted to extend the AFDC-UF program until June 30, 1967.<sup>34</sup> The legislative history of the extension echoes that of 75 Stat. 75 (1961) which established the AFDC-UF program. The House Committee on Ways and Means understood the program to be directed to the unemployment of the father.<sup>35</sup> During the floor debates in the House, several members of the Committee again emphasized that the AFDC-UF program was intended to assist families deprived of support by the unemployment of the "breadwinner."<sup>36</sup> During the floor debates in the Senate, members of the Senate Finance

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mine "what percentage of the newly accredited unemployed carried on your rolls, as unemployed, are housewives, that is, they are not principal breadwinners . . ." 1961 *Hearings*, *supra* note 23, 73. The following colloquy ensued:

MR. ALGER. Mr. Secretary, . . . we would like to find out how many of these people are not principal breadwinners . . .

SECRETARY GOLDBERG. . . . For example, . . . taking Little Rock, 83 percent of the claimants for temporary benefits who were men were married. This would indicate that this man is a man who has to support his family.

MR. ALGER. The breadwinner, in other words.

SECRETARY GOLDBERG. Yes, sir.

1961 *Hearings*, *supra* note 23, 74.

<sup>34</sup>Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 131(a), 76 Stat. 193 (1962).

<sup>35</sup>H.R. Rep. No. 1414, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1962). *See also* 108 Cong. Rec. 14139 (1962) (remarks of Rep. Mills, Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means).

<sup>36</sup>108 Cong. Rec. 4272 (1962) (remarks of Rep. Keogh); 108 Cong. Rec. 4282 (1962) (remarks of Rep. Burke); 108 Cong. Rec. 12513 (1962) (remarks of Rep. Byrnes). Other Representatives followed this characterization. *E.g.*, 108 Cong. Rec. 1187 (1962) (remarks of Rep. Riehlman).

Committee<sup>37</sup> and other Senators<sup>38</sup> indicated their understanding that the AFDC-UF program was directed to families with unemployed fathers. The Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee reported that:

It has made the unemployed father feel like the breadwinner again . . .<sup>39</sup>

In 1967, Congress confirmed that the AFDC-UF program was limited to families in which the breadwinner was unemployed. It amended section 407, which had since 1961 conditioned eligibility upon the unemployment of a "parent," to make the unemployment of the "father" the prerequisite to eligibility for the program.<sup>40</sup> The House and Senate committee reports uniformly stated that:

This program was originally conceived as one to provide aid for the children of unemployed fathers. However, some States make families in which the father is working but the mother is unemployed eligible. The bill would not allow such situations. Under the bill, the program could apply only to the children of unemployed fathers.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> 108 Cong. Rec. 12661 (1962) (remarks of Sen. Kerr); 108 Cong. Rec. 13879 (1962) (remarks of Sen. Byrd).

<sup>38</sup> E.g., 108 Cong. Rec. 13871-72 (1962) (remarks of Sen. Randolph).

<sup>39</sup> 108 Cong. Rec. 13879 (1962) (remarks of Sen. Byrd).

<sup>40</sup> Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 203(a), 81 Stat. 882 (1968).

<sup>41</sup> H.R. Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 108 (1967); S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1967), *reprinted in* [1967] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2834, 2997. *But see* Staff of Senate Finance Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess., Summary of Social Security Amendments of 1967, *reprinted in* 113 Cong. Rec. 36306, 36311 (1967) ("The amendments provide that under State programs of aid to families with dependent children of unemployed parents,

This gender-based restriction on eligibility must be recognized for what it was, an effort to condition eligibility upon the unemployment of a family's principal wage-earner whom Congress broadly assumed to be the father. In *Schneider v. McNutt*,<sup>42</sup> where plaintiffs also challenged the constitutionality of the AFDC-UF program on sex-discrimination grounds, the three-judge District Court surmised that:

[T]he decision of Congress to limit coverage to families with unemployed fathers was based on the assumption that the unemployment of fathers will create a greater burden on the family than the unemployment of mothers.<sup>43</sup>

Congress has traditionally spoken of the father when it meant to indicate the family's principal wage-earner. With specific reference to the AFDC-UF program, former Congresswoman Martha Griffiths has complained that:

Like other income security programs, welfare reflects the assumption that the father is the breadwinner.<sup>44</sup>

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Federal matching funds would be available only for the children of unemployed fathers. Under present law States may include children on the basis of the unemployment of mothers, as well as fathers."); 113 Cong. Rec. 36914 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Muskie) ("I object to the provision which restricts ADC benefits under the unemployment program to children of unemployed fathers . . . . This eliminates the current provision benefiting children of unemployed mothers.")

<sup>42</sup> C.A. No. 213-75C3 (W.D. Wash. March 28, 1977).

<sup>43</sup> *Id.*, slip op. at 9.

<sup>44</sup> Griffiths, *Sex Discrimination in Income Security Programs*, 49 Notre Dame Lawyer 534, 541 (1974).

In *Stevens v. Califano*,<sup>45</sup> where plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the AFDC-UF program on the same grounds which plaintiffs raised in this case, the District Court correctly observed that the role of the 1968 amendment was to implement Congress' original intention to condition AFDC-UF eligibility upon the unemployment of the family's principal wage-earner. The District Court stated that:

Congress sought . . . to make the AFDC-U program conform with its original intent. The legislative history of the original enactment . . . [in 1961 indicated] that Congress did not intend the AFDC-U program to provide aid for working poor. Rather, it intended that the program provide aid to families in which the "breadwinner," or "wage earner" was unemployed. . . . The problem with the program, however, was that the language chosen in the original enactment only required one parent to be unemployed. Inasmuch as the AFDC-U program aided two parent families, said language permitted needy families in which the "breadwinner" was fully employed to receive benefits based upon the unemployment of the "non-breadwinner." . . . The purpose of the amendment to Section 607, therefore, was to eliminate benefits to families in which the breadwinner was fully employed.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> 448 F. Supp. 1313 (N.D. Ohio 1978), *appeal docketed*, 47 U.S.L.W. 3227 (1978) (No. 78-449, 1978 Term).

<sup>46</sup> *Id.*, 1320. The rulings in the *Stevens* decision nonetheless followed those in this case on the remedial as well as the constitutional issue. For an analysis of the District Court's rationale for its remedial order in *Stevens*, see *infra*, 37-40.

This legislative history demonstrates that Congress never intended to allow either parent's unemployment to establish a family's eligibility regardless of the other parent's employment status at that time. Adoption of the dual wage-earner model of the AFDC-UF program, which plaintiffs advocated below and which the District Court's final order sanctioned, would grossly increase the scope and cost of the AFDC-UF program beyond what Congress envisioned. By restricting the eligibility of intact families to those whose "breadwinner" was unemployed, Congress expressly conditioned eligibility upon the status of a specific parent within such families. This commitment to the principal wage-earner model is the dominant element in the legislative history of the AFDC-UF program.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> When it first adopted the temporary AFDC-UF program in 1961, Congress justified its extension of assistance to the families of jobless workers as necessary in order to treat needy children equally. *E.g.*, 1961 *Hearings*, *supra* note 23, at 104 (remarks of Rep. Mills and Secretary Ribicoff); 107 Cong. Rec. 3767 (1961) (remarks of Rep. Byrnes) ("The justification for this bill is simply this: It is very difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish as far as the plight of the needy child is concerned between the child in the family of . . . a disabled breadwinner who cannot work, and the needy child in a family where the breadwinner is unable to find work of any kind in order to support his family."). When it voted to extend the AFDC-UF program in 1962, Congress again focused upon this principle of equality of treatment. The reports of the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Finance Committee uniformly stated that:

The committee believes that the children of unemployed parents deserve the same treatment as the children where the father is no longer in the home.

H.R. Rep. No. 1414, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1962); S. Rep. No. 1589, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1962), *reprinted in* [1962] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1943, 1953.

Subsequently, Congress came to place more emphasis upon the importance of the AFDC-UF program as a prophylactic for the incentive which the basic AFDC program gave fathers to desert their families. In 1967, when the



In light of section 407's legislative history, the District Court exceeded its remedial powers when it adopted the dual wage-earner model of the AFDC-UF program. In order to comply with the preeminent Congressional intent behind section 407, any sex-neutral extension of the AFDC-UF program allowing unemployed mothers to establish their families' eligibility must follow the principal wage-earner model.<sup>48</sup> The District Court's rejection of this model of a sex-neutral AFDC-UF program was, therefore, a reversible error of law.

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national AFDC caseload had doubled over the preceding decade, Congress attributed "a very large share of the program growth . . . to family breakup . . ." H.R. Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 96 (1967); S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 145 (1967), *reprinted in* [1967] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2834, 2981. In order to cure this deleterious side effect of the AFDC program, 113 Cong. Rec. 33193-95 (remarks of Sen Harris and Sen. Kennedy of New York) and 36817 (remarks of Sen. Mondale) (1967), the Senate voted to require states participating in the basic AFDC program to adopt an AFDC-UF program. 113 Cong. Rec. 33195 (1967). When the House resisted the imposition of a mandatory program upon the states, however, the Senate receded. 113 Cong. Rec. 36358 (1967); H.R. Rep. No. 1030, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1967), *reprinted in* [1967] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3179, 3203-04.

This legislative history illustrates the genesis of Congress' understanding of the AFDC-UF program. While Congress came to recognize the interplay between the AFDC and the AFDC-UF programs, its original motivation for enacting section 407 was — at bottom — to provide assistance to the children of jobless workers. In order to justify this goal, it had predominantly relied upon the principle of equality of treatment.

<sup>48</sup> The remedy of extension may be exercised only to render what "Congress plainly did intend . . . constitutional." *Welsh v. United States*, 398 U.S. 333, 356 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).



C. *Section 407's Structure Substantiates the Correctness  
of the Principal Wage-Earner Model  
of the AFDC-UF Program.*

An analysis of the administrative framework of section 407 confirms the excessive sweep of the dual wage-earner model of the AFDC-UF program and, accordingly, its impropriety as a remedy for section 407's gender-based discrimination.<sup>40</sup> Under section 407, a family must meet both categorical and financial requirements for eligibility. The major categorical requirement is that the father must meet the federal definition of unemployment, *i.e.*, the father must be employed less than 100 hours per month.<sup>50</sup> The financial requirement is that the family's income may not exceed the AFDC standard of need.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> *Supra*, 11-14.

<sup>50</sup> 42 U.S.C. § 607(a) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 233.100(a)(1)(i) (1977). Section 407 also contains a categorical work-history requirement that, in sum, the father must either (1) have earned fifty dollars or more in six calendar quarters (that is, periods of three consecutive months) within any thirteen-quarter period ending within one year of the application for assistance or (2) have received unemployment compensation within one year prior to the application for assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 607(b)(1)(C) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 233.100(a)(3)(iii) (1977). By its institution of the work-history requirement in Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 203(a) (1968), Congress confirmed its focus upon the family's principal wage-earner. The work-history requirement disqualifies those fathers who have never in fact been breadwinners. *See* H.R. Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 108 (1967) ("[I]t is the intent of your committee to exclude from the program those fathers who have not been in the labor force, or whose attachment to the labor force has been casual."); 113 Cong. Rec. 36785 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy of New York) ("This will cut out young fathers who have never been able to get a job and hold it for a substantial length of time.").

Other categorical requirements under section 407 state that the father must (1) have been unemployed for a thirty-day period prior to receiving assistance and (2) not have refused a bona fide offer of employment within that period without good cause. 42 U.S.C. § 607(b)(1)(A) and (B) (1976).

<sup>51</sup> 45 C.F.R. § 233.100(a)(1) (1977). Participating states are allowed to determine the standard of need for their respective AFDC programs. *Shea v.*

The principal wage-earner model retains the major categorical requirement by conditioning eligibility upon the principal wage-earner being employed less than 100 hours per month. By just requiring that either parent be unemployed, the dual wage-earner model undermines the categorical requirement so as to leave only the income test. It allows families to maintain eligibility longer than does the single-parent model, if not indefinitely, in the following manner. Whenever the parent whose unemployment originally established the family's AFDC-UF eligibility becomes employed for 100 or more hours per month, the other parent can nonetheless maintain the family's eligibility on the basis of his or her present unemployment.<sup>52</sup> This revolving arrangement is capable of indefinite repetition, as, for example, among families whose parents are chronically subject to intermittent unemployment.<sup>53</sup> To the

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*Vialpando*, 416 U.S. 251, 253 (1974). The standard of need represents the amount which the state deems necessary to sustain a hypothetical family at a subsistence level. Both the eligibility of a family and the amount of cash benefits which it will receive are determined through the comparison of its net income and available resources against the standard of need. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) (1977). In determining the family's net income, the state must exclude "any expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of any such income." 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(iv)(a) (1977). If its net income (including available resources) is less than the standard of need, the applicant family is eligible for the AFDC program. Its cash grant will then be based upon the difference between its net income and the standard of need. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(2)(i) (1977). The state may select, however, the extent to which it will bring the family's income up to the standard of need. 416 U.S. at 253-54.

<sup>52</sup> This sketch simplifies the criteria established by section 407 for ease of presentation. One should bear in mind that, if the second parent is unable to meet any of the other criteria (e.g., the work-history requirement), he or she will not be able to maintain the family's eligibility.

<sup>53</sup> In *Carroll v. Finch*, 326 F. Supp. 891 (D. Alaska 1971), where plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought to require the institution of an AFDC-UF program in Alaska, the District Court noted that:

Because of the highly seasonal nature of employment in much of rural Alaska, the AFDC-UP program would have the practical effect

extent that one parent remains unemployed whenever the other parent is employed, economic circumstance could make a family continuously eligible for AFDC-UF benefits. Such a family would lose its eligibility for AFDC-UF only (1) if its income, as reduced by the federal income disregard<sup>54</sup> and for work-related expenses,<sup>55</sup> were to exceed the AFDC standard of need, or (2) if both parents began to work for 100 or more hours per month. The dual wage-earner model thus far exceeds Congress' original vision of the AFDC-UF program as a temporary supplement to families whose breadwinners had been laid off in the course of an economic recession.<sup>56</sup>

The dual wage-earner model violates the legislative intent behind the AFDC-UF program because it would provide an

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of establishing a guaranteed annual income for those welfare recipients in outlying areas.

*Id.*, 895 at n. 3.

<sup>54</sup> Federal law requires a state to disregard the first \$30 earned by a recipient family in any month plus one-third of the remainder of the family's earned income in that month (as well as all earnings by dependent children who are students) when the state reassesses the family's need in order to determine (1) its continued eligibility for AFDC and (2) the size of the cash grant to which the family is entitled for that month. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(7) and (a)(11) (1977). The earned income disregard is available to families only after they have initially been found to be eligible for the AFDC program. The disregard is not available to families when they first apply to participate in the AFDC program. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(7)(ii) (1977).

<sup>55</sup> 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(iv) and (a)(7) (1977). See note 51, *supra*.

<sup>56</sup> See H.R. Rep. No. 28, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1961); 107 Cong. Rec. 3759 (1961) (remarks of Rep. Lane) ("These are the youngsters . . . whom we want to help until the Nation pulls out of the recession, and the economy creates job opportunities that will put their providers to work again and enable them to support their families."). See also *Burr v. Smith*, 322 F. Supp. 980, 981, 983 (W.D. Wash. 1971).

income subsidy to the working poor.<sup>57</sup> The disregard of earned income and the deduction for work-related expenses allow an average recipient family to remain eligible for AFDC-UF benefits in Massachusetts until its gross income reaches the following levels<sup>58</sup>:

Maximum Earnings	Number of Family Members						
	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Weekly	\$234	\$274	\$314	\$355	\$395	\$435	\$475
Annually	\$12,160	\$14,250	\$16,340	\$18,440	\$20,530	\$22,620	\$24,720

<sup>57</sup>In *Stevens v. Califano*, *supra* note 45, at 1320, the District Court recognized from its review of the legislative history that: "It is clear . . . that Congress did not intend the AFDC-U[F] program to provide aid for working poor." *Accord*, *Coon v. Ohio Department of Public Welfare*, No. C 75-925, slip op. at 14 (N.D. Ohio March 1, 1976); *Cheley v. Burson*, 324 F. Supp. 678, 681 (N.D. Ga. 1971), *appeal dismissed for failure to docket within proper time sub nom. Cheley v. Parnham*, 404 U.S. 878 (1971); *Macias v. Finch*, 324 F. Supp. 1252, 1260-61 (N.D. Cal. 1970), *aff'd without opinion sub nom. Macias v. Richardson*, 400 U.S. 913 (1970); *Hart v. Juras*, 17 Or. App. 566, 522 P. 2d 1399, 1400 (Or. App. 1974).

<sup>58</sup>This table reflects the application of the federally mandated disregard of earned income and deduction for work-related expenses to the present standard of need in Massachusetts. In accordance with the earned income disregard, Massachusetts disregards about one third of the earned income of working recipient families when it redetermines their eligibility and their level of benefits. According to the Department of Public Welfare's review of a one per cent sample of its AFDC caseload in 1976, the work-related expenses of working recipient families (which are excluded from their net income) amount to another third of their earned income. As a result of these two factors, only the remaining third of an average family's earnings is counted in the redetermination of its eligibility and level of benefits. In this table, therefore, the income eligibility limits of working recipient families represent the level at which one third of their gross earnings equals Massachusetts' standard of need. For example, the present standard of need for a four-person family is \$395.50 per month. This figure incorporates the monthly consolidated grant and a *pro rata* portion of the quarterly payment. See 6 Mass. CHSR III, Subch. A, Pt. 304, Subpt. D, § 304.215, as amended

As presently structured, the AFDC-UF program controls this tendency toward providing an open-ended income subsidy through its major categorical requirement that the father must be employed for less than 100 hours per month. 45 C.F.R. § 233.100(a)(1)(i) (1977). The Commissioner has found that a family's eligibility terminates more often for categorical than financial reasons under the existing AFDC-UF program. Since it would remove that program's major categorical requirement, the dual wage-earner model would indefinitely supplement the income of a large number of intact families that are not needy by conventional standards.<sup>59</sup> These recipient families may, in combination with their earnings, own an automobile and a home because ownership of such assets does not affect their eligibility for AFDC-UF benefits.<sup>60</sup>

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at Mass. Reg. Issue No. 88 at 128 (1977); 6 Mass. CHSR III, Subch. A, Pt. 304, Subpt. D, § 304.218, as amended at Mass. Reg. Special Issue No. 8 at 76 (1976). Since two thirds of its earnings will be discounted, a four-person recipient family will remain eligible for assistance as long as one third of its monthly gross earnings does not exceed \$395.50. Dividing \$395.50 by .333 produces the quotient of \$1,187.68. A four-person family thus remains eligible for assistance until its income reaches \$1,187.68 per month or approximately \$14,250.00 per year. The annual income figures in this table are rounded off to the nearest ten. The weekly income figures are then derived by dividing the annual income by 52.

<sup>59</sup>In *Henry v. Betit*, 323 F. Supp. 418 (D. Alaska 1971), where plaintiffs unsuccessfully challenged Alaska's failure to institute an AFDC-UF program, the three-judge District Court observed that the program was "not designed to provide a guaranteed annual income to those who are capable of gainful employment." *Id.*, 425. In *Armstrong v. Candon*, 451 F. Supp. 1148 (D. Vt. 1978), where AFDC-UF applicants challenged certain work-related requirements imposed by Vermont, the District Court noted Vermont's concern that AFDC-UF was becoming "a way of life, rather than simply a temporary means of assisting unemployed fathers with families." *Id.*, 1152.

<sup>60</sup>45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(i) (1977); 6 Mass. CHSR III, Subch. A, Pt. 303, Subpt. A, § 303.21-22 [Mass. Reg. Special Issue No. 8 at 28-29 (1976)].

Recipient families would be able to maintain AFDC-UF eligibility despite their substantial incomes because the AFDC-UF program treats the incomes of recipient families differently than the incomes of applicant families. In order to provide recipients with an incentive to work, the incomes of recipients are reduced not only by their work-related expenses but also in accordance with the federally mandated income disregard.<sup>61</sup> When a household first applies for AFDC-UF benefits, only work-related expenses are deducted from its earned income before its net income is compared against the standard of need.<sup>62</sup> The following table compares the income eligibility limits for applicant and recipient households in Massachusetts in terms of annual income<sup>63</sup>:

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<sup>61</sup> For the legislative history of Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 202(b) (1968) enacting the income disregard, see H.R. Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 106-07 (1967); S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 157-59 (1967), reprinted in [1967] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2834, 2994-96.

<sup>62</sup> 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(7)(ii) (1977). In their reports recommending the enactment of the earned income disregard for recipients in 1967, the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Finance Committee uniformly stated that:

One possible result of this provision is that one family, who started out below assistance levels, will have some grant payable at certain earnings levels because of the exemption of later earnings while another family which already had the same earnings will receive no grant. Your committee appreciates the objections to this type of situation which can be made; but the alternative would have increased the costs of the proposal by about \$160 million a year by placing people on the AFDC rolls who now have earnings in excess of their need for public assistance as determined under their State plan. In short, the various provisions included in your committee's bill are designed to get people off AFDC rolls, not put them on.

H.R. Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 107 (1967); S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 159 (1967), reprinted in [1967] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2834, 2996.

<sup>63</sup> In its calculation of the income eligibility limits of AFDC applicants, this table assumes that their work-related expenses would, similarly to those of



## Number of Family Members

Maximum Earnings	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
AFDC Recipients	12,160	14,250	16,340	18,440	20,530	22,620	24,720
AFDC Applicants	6,070	7,120	8,160	9,210	10,250	11,300	12,340

The discrepancy in eligibility limits demonstrates that a dual wage-earner model would extend the scope of the AFDC-UF program far beyond the legislative goal of temporary assistance to families subjected to unemployment. Given the differential between the income limits for applicant and recipient households, a household determined to be eligible may then remain eligible until it doubles its original income. For a family of five, this means that, if the family qualifies when it has a gross annual income of \$8,160, it can continue to receive AFDC benefits as long as its total earnings do not exceed \$16,340 per year. The result is an income subsidy for those working poor who meet the initial eligibility limit at some point in time. Without the major categorical requirement embodied in the principal wage-earner model, the AFDC-UF program overflows the modest channel which Congress de-

AFDC recipients, equal one third of gross earnings. Under this assumption, the income eligibility limit of an applicant family equals the level at which two thirds of its gross earnings equal the standard of need. For example, the standard of need for a family of four is \$395.50. Dividing \$395.50 by .667 produces the quotient of \$592.95. A four-person family is thus eligible to begin receiving assistance until its gross income reaches \$592.95 per month or approximately \$7,120.00 per year. The annual income figures for AFDC applicants in this table are rounded off to the nearest ten.

vised "to provide temporary aid to the needy children of jobless workers."<sup>64</sup>

*D. The District Court Improperly Failed to Assess the Comparative Costs of the Alternative Remedies as an Index of How Congress Itself Would Have Chosen to Correct Section 407's Underinclusiveness.*

The District Court failed to consider the cost differential between the principal wage-earner and the dual wage-earner models of the AFDC-UF program as an index of Congressional intent when it selected a remedy for section 407's underinclusiveness. This omission violated the precept that:

[T]he feasibility of accommodating the administrative framework and legislative goals of a statute should be a primary consideration in deciding whether to extend it. Surely one of the legislative goals to be considered in extending a benefit paid for out of public funds is the additional toll that will be taken on the public fisc by adding to the class of persons entitled to the benefit. Each extension of a benefit in such a case involves a corresponding increase in the burden on the taxpayers.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> 107 Cong. Rec. 3759 (1961) (remarks of Rep. Lane). Section 407's work-history requirement would not counteract the open-ended eligibility which the dual wage-earner model of the AFDC-UF program permits. The work-history requirement means only that a parent must have earned \$300.00 over a period of 39 months within one year of the date of an application for assistance. See note 50, *supra*. This requirement poses little difficulty for applicants other than "the hard-core, long-term unemployed." 113 Cong. Rec. 36817 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Mondale).

<sup>65</sup> Note, *Extension Versus Invalidation of Underinclusive Statutes: A Remedial Alternative*, 12 Colum. J.L. and Soc. Probs. 115, 134 (1975).



When considering whether to extend an underinclusive statute, federal courts have often considered the incremental costs associated with its extension. *E.g.*, *Jablon v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare*, 399 F. Supp. 118, 132 (D. Md. 1975), *aff'd*, 430 U.S. 924 (1977); *Moreno v. U.S. Department of Agriculture*, 345 F. Supp. 310, 315-16 (D. D.C. 1972), *aff'd*, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). In *Jablon*, the District Court decided to extend the statute on the ground that the restrictive remedy of requiring wives as well as husbands to demonstrate dependency would be more costly for administrative reasons than the expansive remedy of enjoining the enforcement of the requirement that husbands must demonstrate dependency. Similarly, in *Moreno*, the court chose to extend the statute because extension would not require "the expenditure of public funds to a greater extent than now authorized." 345 F. Supp. at 316.

The Commissioner estimates that, once the expanded programs were fully operational, the net incremental cost in AFDC benefits of operating the dual wage-earner model in Massachusetts would be \$23,000,000 per year, as compared with \$3,300,000 per year for the principal wage-earner model.<sup>66</sup> The dual wage-earner model would, therefore, cost \$19,700,000 more per year than the principal wage-earner model in Massachusetts alone. The significance of this differ-

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<sup>66</sup> Affidavit of Jenny Netzer in Support of Defendant Sharp's Motion to Clarify or, Alternatively, to Amend the Court's Order of April 20, 1978 [Netzer Affidavit], ¶¶ 3 and 14 (A. 49-50, 54-55). These estimates refer to the incremental cost of AFDC benefits prior to the division of that cost between the federal and the state governments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1976). These estimates do not include the cost of the Medicaid benefits which these additional AFDC-UF recipients would receive pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (1976). In his jurisdictional statement in *Califano v. Westcott*, No. 78-437, p. 7 at n. 6, the Secretary estimated that the overall incremental cost to the federal and the participating state governments of providing AFDC and Medicaid benefits in accordance with an extended AFDC-UF program would be \$471,900,000 in fiscal year 1980.

ence is magnified when one considers that the \$23,000,000 dual wage-earner remedy would almost double the annual cost of the AFDC-UF program in Massachusetts, which stood at approximately \$30,000,000 prior to the District Court's ruling.<sup>67</sup> The higher cost of the dual wage-earner model is a product of its propensity to allow more families to establish initial eligibility and its lesser capacity to reassess the eligibility of a recipient family in light of changes in the parents' employment status.

When considering the proper extension of an underinclusive classification, the judiciary should hold firmly in mind the legitimate importance which Congress places upon the fiscal integrity of federal-state welfare programs.<sup>68</sup> In *Quern v. Mandley*, 436 U.S. 725 (1978), this Court rejected a challenge to Illinois' Emergency Assistance Program which asserted that Illinois had impermissibly narrowed the definition of eligibility established by 42 U.S.C. § 406(e) (1976). Noting the extreme breadth of the definition of eligibility advocated by the plaintiffs, this Court declined to impute to Congress the intention to create "an entirely open-ended program not susceptible of meaningful fiscal or programmatic control by the States."<sup>69</sup> The comparative incremental costs of the principal wage-earner and dual wage-earner models suggest that Congress would have enacted the less expensive form of a sex-neutral

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<sup>67</sup> Netzer Affidavit, ¶ 15 (A. 55). If the eligibility of the existing caseload were redetermined in accordance with the requirement that the family's principal wage-earner must meet the categorical requirements of section 407, the cost of the existing caseload would decrease. Those recipient families where the mother qualified as the principal wage-earner but failed to meet the categorical requirements of section 407 would no longer be eligible.

<sup>68</sup> E.g., *Dandridge v. Williams*, 397 U.S. 471, 478 (1970). See Note, *Extension Versus Invalidation of Underinclusive Statutes: A Remedial Alternative*, 12 Colum J.L. and Soc. Probs. 115, 128-40 (1975).

<sup>69</sup> *Quern v. Mandley*, 436 U.S. 725, 746 (1978).

AFDC-UF program if it, rather than the Court, were undertaking to remedy the underinclusiveness of the current program.<sup>70</sup>

By its selection of the dual wage-earner model which departs so substantially in cost and structure from Congress' conception of the AFDC-UF program, the District Court exceeded its "presumed grant of power . . . to render what Congress plainly did intend, constitutional."<sup>71</sup> Its remedy, therefore, violates the principle of separation of powers.<sup>72</sup>

*E. The Present Availability of AFDC-UF Benefits to Families Where the Mother is Fully Employed Does Not Require the Adoption of the Dual Wage-Earner Model of the AFDC-UF Program.*

While the preceding argument addresses the District Court's reasons for its choice of remedy, Judge Contie developed an independent rationale in *Stevens v. Califano* for his selection of the same dual wage-earner model to remedy section 407's constitutional defect. Although he recognized that Congress had designed the AFDC-UF program to assist "needy families in which both parents were unemployed," he nonetheless selected the dual wage-earner model because "AFDC-UF benefits are already available to needy families with unemployed

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<sup>70</sup>In order to reconstruct the picture of the AFDC-UF program which Congress had before it in 1967, one should recall that the AFDC-UF caseload in Massachusetts consisted of 650 families with 2,500 children in May, 1967. 113 Cong. Rec. 33630 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy of Massachusetts). By way of contrast, the dual-parent model would now add an additional 8,000 families to the program while the single-parent model would add only another 700 families. Netzer Affidavit, ¶¶ 3 and 14 (A. 49-50, 54-55).

<sup>71</sup>*Welsh v. United States*, 398 U.S. 333, 356 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).

<sup>72</sup>*Supra*, 11-14.

fathers in which the mother is fully employed.”<sup>73</sup> In order to treat unemployed mothers equivalently, Judge Contie extended the AFDC-UF program to include “needy families with unemployed mothers . . . whose husbands are fully employed.”<sup>74</sup>

The background for Judge Contie’s analysis in *Stevens* lies in *Coon v. Ohio Department of Public Welfare*,<sup>75</sup> an earlier decision pertaining to Ohio’s AFDC-UF program which Judge Contie cites in his opinion.<sup>76</sup> The plaintiff father in *Coon* had challenged the AFDC-UF rule that he must be employed for less than 100 hours per month on the theory that the rule was gender-biased because it did not also apply to the female parent in a family receiving AFDC-UF benefits. In its opinion, the three-judge District Court considered an Ohio regulation that:

The fact that the mother is fully employed does not preclude establishing eligibility if the family is in need and the father is unemployed.<sup>77</sup>

Upon comparing the Ohio regulation with the federal regulation defining a father’s unemployment for purposes of AFDC-UF,<sup>78</sup> the Court then observed that:

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<sup>73</sup>*Stevens v. Califano*, *supra* note 45, at 1323, n. 11.

<sup>74</sup>*Stevens v. Califano*, *supra* note 45, at 1323, n. 11.

<sup>75</sup>No. C 75-925 (N.D. Ohio March 1, 1976).

<sup>76</sup>*Stevens v. Califano*, *supra* note 45, at 1320.

<sup>77</sup>*Coon v. Ohio Department of Public Welfare*, No. C. 75-925, slip op. at 10 (N.D. Ohio March 1, 1976). While the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare does not have a regulation similar to the Ohio regulation, it has not denied applications for AFDC-UF benefits in cases where the father was unemployed because of the mother’s concurrent employment.

<sup>78</sup>45 C.F.R. § 233.100(a)(1)(i) (1977).

While the federal regulation contains no similar sentence, it has the same effect. Since eligibility for ADC-U does not depend upon the mother's status, the 100-hour rule is inapplicable to her and therefore she can work more than 100 hours.<sup>79</sup>

In light of this reading of the federal and state law governing the AFDC-UF program in Ohio, Judge Contie apparently understood the state practice of disregarding the mother's employment status to be binding upon him.

Judge Contie's reliance upon this state practice as authority for the adoption of a dual wage-earner model is misplaced. That practice did not itself institute a dual wage-earner model, since the AFDC-UF program still retained the categorical requirement that the father must be unemployed.<sup>80</sup> This categorical requirement served to preclude the revolving arrangement by which one parent's unemployment can maintain AFDC-UF eligibility whenever the other parent begins to work 100 or more hours per month.<sup>81</sup> The practice of disregarding the mother's employment status under the current

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<sup>79</sup>*Coon v. Ohio Department of Public Welfare*, *supra* note 77, at 10. The court later declared that:

[T]he statutory scheme indicates, and this court determines, that mothers in ADC-U families are not limited in the number of hours they can work because mothers, unlike fathers, cannot qualify their families for ADC-U in the first place.

*Id.* at 16-17.

<sup>80</sup>See *Coon v. Ohio Department of Public Welfare*, *supra* note 77, at 14 ("Although plaintiff challenges the gender-based classification embodied in the 100-hour ceiling on employment, plaintiff ignores the gender-based classification upon which the entire AFDC-UF program rests."). See also *id.*, 16-17.

<sup>81</sup>*Supra*, 27-29.

AFDC-UF program does not, therefore, constitute a precedent for the implementation of the dual wage-earner model.

To the extent that section 407's legislative history supports a definition of eligibility which disregards the concurrent employment of the non-breadwinner parent,<sup>82</sup> the principal wage-earner model conforms to that legislative history in an appropriately sex-neutral manner. The principal wage-earner model would disregard the other parent's employment once the family's principal wage-earner had been identified. The goal of the principal wage-earner model is only to condition AFDC-UF benefits upon the unemployment of that parent who is in fact the family breadwinner.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> See 107 Cong. Rec. 3765 (1961) (remarks of Reps. Dominick and Mills); *Public Assistance Act of 1962: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Finance on H.R. 10606*, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 112-36 (1962) [hereinafter cited as *1962 Hearings*]. In the hearings before the Senate Finance Committee on the extension of the AFDC-UF program in 1962, Secretary Ribicoff of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) introduced an HEW report on the operation of the AFDC-UF program in thirteen states from May to November, 1961. Appendix 4 to that report indicated that some states had defined eligibility in terms of the unemployment of either parent. *1962 Hearings*, 118-22. Congress was thus aware in 1962 of the various definitions of eligibility established by the states. Of course, in 1967, it fashioned a more uniform definition of eligibility. See note 41, *supra*. See also *Stevens v. California*, *supra* note 45, at 1320-21.

<sup>83</sup> The Court should be aware that implementation of the principal wage-earner model of the AFDC-UF program, as proposed by the Commissioner, would terminate certain recipient families who are presently eligible on the basis of the father's unemployment. The determinant characteristic of these families would be the present employment for 100 or more hours per month of a mother who would qualify as the principal wage-earner. However, an otherwise justifiable reformulation of the AFDC-UF program which, *inter alia*, terminates the eligibility of such families does not, by virtue of such termination, offend the Constitution, as plaintiffs may argue. For example, federal courts have rebuffed a constitutional challenge to Maine's decision to discontinue participation in the AFDC-UF program. *United Low Income, Inc. v. Fisher*, 340 F. Supp. 150 (D. Me. 1972), *aff'd*, 470 F. 2d 1074 (1st Cir. 1972).

### Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court should reverse the District Court's order concerning remedy, dated August 9, 1978, and remand the case to the District Court for entry of a remedial order consonant with the principal wage-earner model of the AFDC-UF program proposed by the Commissioner.<sup>84</sup>

Respectfully submitted,

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January 26, 1979

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<sup>84</sup>Remand would similarly be appropriate if this Court were to decide that the Secretary retained the discretion under section 407 to choose between the principal wage-earner and the dual wage-earner models of the AFDC-UF program.



No. 78-689

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MICHAEL ROBAK, JR., CLERK

**In the Supreme Court of the United States**

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

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ALEXANDER SHARP, II, COMMISSIONER OF THE  
MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF  
PUBLIC WELFARE, APPELLANT

v.

CINDY WESTCOTT, ET AL.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

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BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL APPELLEE

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WADE H. MCCREE, JR.  
*Solicitor General*  
*Department of Justice*  
*Washington, D.C. 20530*

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## INDEX

	Page
Opinion below .....	1
Jurisdiction .....	1
Question presented .....	2
Constitutional and statutory provisions involved .....	2
Statement .....	3
Summary of argument .....	4
Argument .....	5
A state AFDC-UF plan must include any family with a parent who meets the federal definition of unemployment, and the current federal regulations do not permit the adoption of a state plan that excludes an unemployed parent who is not the principal wage-earner in the family .....	5
A. Section 407 establishes certain criteria for the definition of parental unemployment, and it leaves to the Secretary further definition of the term "unemployment" .....	5
B. The Secretary's regulations do not permit states to adopt plans limited to families with unemployed parents who have been principal breadwinners .....	7

Argument—Continued	Page
C. The district court correctly concluded that it could not authorize the adoption of a state plan that would narrow the federal standard of eligibility for aid .....	7
Conclusion .....	10

## CITATIONS

## Cases:

<i>Batterton v. Francis</i> , 432 U.S. 416 .....	6
<i>Burns v. Alcala</i> , 420 U.S. 575 .....	8
<i>King v. Smith</i> , 392 U.S. 309 .....	8
<i>Orr v. Orr</i> , No. 77-1119 (Mar. 5, 1979) ..	8
<i>Philbrook v. Glodgett</i> , 421 U.S. 707 .....	6, 8
<i>Quern v. Mandley</i> , 436 U.S. 725 .....	4, 8
<i>Stanton v. Stanton</i> , 421 U.S. 7 .....	8
<i>Townsend v. Swank</i> , 404 U.S. 282 .....	8

## Constitution, statutes and regulation:

United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment, Due Process Clause .....	2, 3, 5
Act of May 8, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-31, 75 Stat. 75 .....	6
Social Security Act, Title IV, 42 U.S.C. 601 <i>et seq.</i> :	
Section 407, 42 U.S.C. 607.....	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9
Section 407(a), 42 U.S.C. 607(a)....	5
Section 407(b)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. 607(b)(1)(B) .....	6
Section 407(b)(1)(C), 42 U.S.C. 607(b)(1)(C) .....	5
Section 407(b)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. 607(b)(2)(C) .....	6
45 C.F.R. 233.100(a)(1) .....	7

### III

#### Miscellaneous:

#### Page

H.R. Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) .....	6
S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) .....	6



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*ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
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**BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL APPELLEE**

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**OPINION BELOW**

The order of the district court (J.S. App. 13a-14a) is not reported.

**JURISDICTION**

The order of the district court was entered on August 9, 1978 (J.S. App. 13a-14a). A notice of appeal to this Court was filed on August 24, 1978 (J.S. App. 15a), and the appeal was docketed on October 23, 1978. Probable jurisdiction was noted on December 11, 1978. The jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1252 because of the pendency of an appeal (*Califano v. Westcott*, No. 78-437) from the district court's order of April 20, 1978, declaring unconstitutional and enjoining the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare from enforcing part of 42 U.S.C. 607.

### QUESTION PRESENTED

The district court held that Section 407 of the Social Security Act, which provides benefits to two-parent families in which a dependent child is deprived of parental support because of the unemployment of his father but does not provide benefits when the mother becomes unemployed, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

The question presented is whether the district court erred in holding that the gender distinction should be remedied by the extension of benefits to two-parent families in which a dependent child is deprived of parental support because of the unemployment of either parent, rather than the extension of benefits to only those two-parent families where the principal wage-earner parent is unemployed.

### CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part:

No person shall be \* \* \* deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law \* \* \*.

Section 407 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 607, is set forth in the Appendix to the Secretary's brief in No. 78-437.

#### STATEMENT

The statutory framework and most of the pertinent facts are set out in the Secretary's brief in No. 78-437. We recount here only the additional facts pertinent to this appeal.

The district court concluded, in light of the congressional commitment to the goal of aiding needy children where there is parental unemployment, and the disruptive effect of cancelling the AFDC-UF program, that the proper remedy (given its holding that the gender distinction drawn by Section 407 violates the Due Process Clause) is the extension of the AFDC-UF program to all families with needy dependent children where either parent is unemployed within the meaning of the Act and implementing regulations.

On June 7, 1978, appellant moved for clarification or modification of the district court's order to permit the adoption of a state plan providing benefits only to families with dependent children who were deprived of parental support by reason of the unemployment of the parent who had been the principal wage-earner.

On August 9, 1978, the district court declined to amend its order, concluding (J.S. App. 13a) that any further reformulation of the statutory scheme beyond deletion of the gender distinction was a matter for Congress, and that Massachusetts is "not free to narrow the federal standards that define the cate-



gories of people eligible for aid' under the AFDC program," quoting *Quern v. Mandley*, 436 U.S. 725, 740 (1978).

#### SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The district court correctly concluded that, in remedying what it found to be an unlawful gender distinction between unemployed fathers and mothers in Section 407, it could not authorize the adoption of a state AFDC-UF plan that would exclude an unemployed parent who is not the principal wage-earner in the family. Section 407 gives the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare—not the states—the authority to set definitions of parental unemployment beyond the minimal statutory criteria. A state may not narrow or restrict the categories of persons, established by federal law, who are eligible for AFDC benefits. The current federal regulations, adopted pursuant to the authority delegated to the Secretary, do not permit the states to exclude a parent who otherwise meets federal standards just because he is not the principal wage-earner in the family.

The district court did not purport to restrict the Secretary's authority to define "unemployment" in any gender-neutral way. If the decision holding Section 407 to be unconstitutional is affirmed, the Secretary would then consider whether and how to redefine the term "unemployment" in order to administer an unemployed parent—rather than an unemployed father—program.

## ARGUMENT

A STATE AFDC-UF PLAN MUST INCLUDE ANY FAMILY WITH A PARENT WHO MEETS THE FEDERAL DEFINITION OF UNEMPLOYMENT, AND THE CURRENT FEDERAL REGULATIONS DO NOT PERMIT THE ADOPTION OF A STATE PLAN THAT EXCLUDES AN UNEMPLOYED PARENT WHO IS NOT THE PRINCIPAL WAGE-EARNER IN THE FAMILY

A. Section 407 Establishes Certain Criteria For The Definition Of Parental Unemployment, And It Leaves To The Secretary Further Definition Of The Term "Unemployment"

Section 407 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 607, gives the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, not the States, the authority to set standards of coverage in cases of parental<sup>1</sup> unemployment not specifically governed by the criteria established in the statute.<sup>2</sup> Section 407(a) defines the term "dependent

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<sup>1</sup> Although Section 407 refers to the unemployment of a needy child's "father," the question of remedy arises only if, as the district court held, the gender distinction employed in Section 407 violates the Due Process Clause, and the Section must be given a gender-neutral construction. For the purposes of our discussion of the remedy if Section 407 is held unconstitutional, we will use the gender-neutral terms "parent" and "parental" in discussing the requirements of Section 407 and the implementing regulations.

<sup>2</sup> Section 407 requires, *inter alia*, that the unemployed parent show that he has worked during at least six of the 13 quarters ending within one year of his application for aid, or that he received or was qualified to receive unemployment compensation within one year prior to his application for aid. 42 U.S.C. 607(b) (1) (C). Section 407 also provides, in effect, that a parent is not unemployed for purposes of that Section

child" to include "a needy child who meets the requirements of [42 U.S.C. 606(a)(2)] who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the unemployment (as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary) of his father \* \* \*."

The establishment of federal standards for "unemployment" was a deliberate change from prior practice. The temporary legislation that preceded Section 407 had left the definition of parental unemployment to the states. See the Act of May 8, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-31, 75 Stat. 75.<sup>3</sup> When Section 407 was adopted as permanent legislation, Congress concluded that "the wide variation in the definitions used by the States" had "worked to the detriment of the program," and accordingly it adopted a uniform federal definition of unemployment. H.R. Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 108 (1967); S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1967). See *Batterton v. Francis*, 432 U.S. 416, 419 & n.4 (1977); *Philbrook v. Glodgett*, 421 U.S. 707, 710 & n.6 (1975).

As this Court concluded in *Batterton v. Francis*, *supra*, 432 U.S. at 425, in exercising the delegated "power to prescribe standards for determining what

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if he has refused a bona fide offer of employment or training for employment without good cause within a period prescribed by the Secretary. 42 U.S.C. 607(b)(1)(B). The parent also must be registered with the state public employment office before his child may receive benefits. 42 U.S.C. 607(b)(2)(C).

<sup>3</sup> The Act provided that the term "dependent child" included a needy child "deprived of parental support or care by reason of the unemployment (as defined by the State) of a parent \* \* \*." 75 Stat. 75.

constitutes 'unemployment' for purposes of AFDC-UF eligibility," the Secretary has the authority not only to interpret the statutory terms, but also to adopt "regulations with legislative effect."

**B. The Secretary's Regulations Do Not Permit States To Adopt Plans Limited To Families With Unemployed Parents Who Have Been Principal Breadwinners**

The regulations promulgated by the Secretary do not give the states the option of adopting plans that provide assistance only where the parent who had been the primary wage-earner in the family becomes unemployed. To the contrary, the regulations now in force require that each participating state adopt a definition of unemployed father that "must include any father" who meets stated requirements. 45 C.F.R. 233.100(a)(1). That regulation, with a sex-neutral construction, requires that a state plan include any parent who meets federal requirements of "unemployment." No federal rule requires an "unemployed" father (or parent) to show that he has been the principal wage-earner in the family.

**C. The District Court Correctly Concluded That It Could Not Authorize The Adoption Of A State Plan That Would Narrow The Federal Standard Of Eligibility For Aid**

The district court rejected appellant's request that it clarify or (if necessary) modify its initial remedial order to permit the state to adopt a gender-neutral plan limited to families in which the unemployed parent was the principal family wage-earner. It con-

cluded, properly we submit, that Section 407 vests in the Secretary—not the individual states—the authority to set the standards for the parental unemployment necessary to make a family eligible for AFDC benefits. Appellant thus may not adopt a plan that would “‘narrow the federal standards that define the categories of people eligible for aid’ under the AFDC program.” J.S. App. 13a, quoting *Quern v. Mandley*, 436 U.S. 725, 740 (1978). See *Philbrook v. Glodgett*, *supra*, 421 U.S. at 719; *Burns v. Alcala*, 420 U.S. 575, 578 (1975); *Townsend v. Swank*, 404 U.S. 282, 286 (1971); *King v. Smith*, 392 U.S. 309, 333 n.34 (1968). Appellant’s request that the Court fashion a *cy pres* remedy and establish the plan “Congress [would] have established if it had known of section 407’s [unconstitutionality] when it enacted that statute” (Br. 10) should be declined, because Congress prescribed a specific device for filling statutory gaps. That device is the issuance of regulations by the Secretary. The Secretary, not the Court, must decide whether and how “unemployment” should be redefined in light of any constitutional flaw in the statute. Cf. *Stanton v. Stanton*, 421 U.S. 7, 17-18 (1975); *Orr v. Orr*, No. 77-1119 (Mar. 5, 1979).

Appellant contends that the district court erred in refusing to authorize the state to adopt plans limiting benefits to families in which the primary wage-earner is unemployed. He urges (Br. 14-26) that the legislative history of Section 407 demonstrates that Congress intended to provide aid to children in families in which the breadwinner was unemployed, and that

an unqualified extension of Section 407 to families where either parent is unemployed would broaden the AFDC program beyond Congress' intent. Appellant also urges (Br. 34-37) that the district court failed to consider the greatly increased cost of extending AFDC benefits to families where either parent is unemployed, which, appellant argues, supports the view that Congress would respond to the deletion of the gender distinction in Section 407 by limiting benefits to families where the primary wage-earner is unemployed.

Appellant does not argue, however, that the Secretary's regulations—interpreted as we have done here—are unlawful. The district court therefore correctly concluded that appellant's arguments are beside the point, given the structure of Section 407, which leaves any further definition or restriction of the term unemployment—beyond the minimal statutory criteria—to the Secretary. The district court did not purport to restrict the Secretary's authority to define "unemployment" in any gender-neutral way. If the decision holding Section 407 to be unconstitutional should be affirmed, the Secretary then would consider whether to adopt additional criteria for defining unemployment (or to seek remedial legislation) in light of the additional costs imposed and the other problems appellant foresees in the administration of an unemployed parent program.<sup>4</sup> Of course, any state dissatis-

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<sup>4</sup> Among other alternatives, the Secretary would consider the adoption of a principal wage-earner test.

fied with the federal standard remains free to withdraw from the program.

### CONCLUSION

If the Court affirms the judgment in *Califano v. Westcott*, No. 78-437, then it should affirm the order challenged here. If it reverses the judgment in No. 78-437, it should vacate the order challenged here.

Respectfully submitted.

WADE H. MCCREE, JR.  
*Solicitor General*

MARCH 1979





IN THE  
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES  
OCTOBER TERM, 1978

Supreme Court, U. S.  
**FILED**  
APR 11 1979  
MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

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No. 78-689

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JOHN D. PRATT,  
Commissioner of the Massachusetts  
Department of Public Welfare,

Appellant,

v.

CINDY WESTCOTT, ET AL.,

Appellees.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT  
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

---

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANT

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	2
Argument	3
I. All parties and <u>amici</u> agree as a matter of legislative history that, when Congress defined eligibility for AFDC-UF benefits in terms of the unemployment of the father, it assumed that fathers were the principal wage-earners in their families.	3
II. The Secretary's argument that his statutory power to define unemployment precludes the judiciary from adopting the principal wage-earner model to cure Section 407's gender-based defect overstates the scope of his power.	6
III. Plaintiffs-appellees and <u>amici</u> fail to formulate a remedial principle which justifies their preference for the dual wage-earner model of the AFDC-UF program.	13

IV.	<u>Amici's</u> contention that the dual wage-earner model is preferable because it more closely resembles AFDC ignores the distinct nature of the AFDC-UF program.	17
V.	Plaintiffs-appellees and <u>amici</u> cannot escape the fact that the dual wage-earner model of the AFDC-UF program is significantly more expensive than the principal wage-earner model.	19
VI.	The notion advanced by plaintiffs-appellees and <u>amici</u> that adoption of the principal wage-earner model should be left to Congress improperly implies that the judiciary should abdicate its remedial responsibility.	20
	Conclusion	23

TABLE OF AUTHORITIESCases

Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Product, Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944)	10, 11
Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977)	8, 9, 12, 17
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977)	14
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)	14
Jablon v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 430 U.S. 924 (1977)	14
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968)	17
Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970)	18
Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707 (1975)	10, 11

Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,  
420 U.S. 636 (1975) 14

Welsh v. United States,  
398 U.S. 333 (1970) 6, 13, 16, 21

Statutes

42 U.S.C. § 1302 (1976) 22

Regulations

45 C.F.R. § 233.100(a)(1) 6

Legislative Materials

H.R. Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong.,  
1st Sess. (1967) 11

S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967),  
reprinted in [1967] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.  
News 2834 11

Miscellaneous

Davis, Administrative Law Treatise  
§ 5.03 (1958 and Supp. 1978) 9

Lurie, Major Changes in the Structure of the AFDC Program Since 1935, 59 Cornell L. Rev. 825 (1974)	18
Note, Extension Versus Invalidation of Underinclusive Statutes: A Remedial Alternative, 12 Colum. J.L. and Soc. Probs. 115 (1975)	15
Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 44.13 (4th ed. 1973)	16
Task Force on Sex Discrimination, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice, Interim Report to the President (1978)	5





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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT  
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---

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANT

---

INTRODUCTION

Appellant John D. Pratt, Commissioner of the  
Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare  
(Commissioner), submits this reply brief in order to

respond to the arguments advanced by plaintiffs-appellees Cindy Westcott, et al. (Westcott), defendant-appellee Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (Secretary), and amici curiae American Civil Liberties Union, et al. (ACLU), in support of the District Court's remedy for the gender-based defect which it found in Section 407 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1976). The District Court required the Commissioner to provide AFDC-UF benefits to needy families if either parent met the federal definition of unemployment regardless of the employment status of the other parent (the dual wage-earner model of the AFDC-UF program). In his appeal, the Commissioner has maintained, as he did below, that the proper sex-neutral remedy is to condition eligibility upon the unemployment of the family's principal wage-earner (the principal wage-earner model of the AFDC-UF program).

ARGUMENT

- I. All Parties and Amici Agree as a Matter of Legislative History That, When Congress Defined Eligibility for AFDC-UF Benefits in Terms of the Unemployment of the Father, It Assumed That Fathers Were the Principal Wage-Earners in Their Families.

While they oppose the principal wage-earner model of the AFDC-UF program, appellees and amici nevertheless agree with the Commissioner's reading of Section 407's legislative history. Congress enacted the AFDC-UF program in order to alleviate the plight of families whose breadwinner (i.e., principal wage-earner) had become unemployed. In its treatment of this problem, Congress assumed that the principal wage-earners whose unemployment would impoverish families were fathers, not mothers. Commissioner's brief, 14-26. Thus, in the portion of their brief addressing Section 407's constitutionality, plaintiffs-appellees press the point that:

In both 1961 and 1967 Congress . . . generally discussed the role of parents as providers

in sex stereotypical terms with the father as the breadwinner and the mother as a non-breadwinner homemaker. Westcott brief, 12.

See also Id., 26, 31-32, 34-37, 48-49, and 56. For the similar view of amici, see ACLU brief, 35 ("Congress was operating under the traditional assumption of the father's preeminent economic role in the family unit...."). See also Id., 17, 30-31, 34-35, and 78.

Although the Secretary does not address this dimension of Section 407's legislative history in his brief on remedy, his brief on Section 407's constitutionality asserts that "[t]he impetus for the enactment of Section 407 was not an unsupported belief, based on sexual stereotypes, that fathers were more likely than mothers to be breadwinners . . . ." Secretary's brief in No. 78-437, 33. The Secretary ignores the contrary evidence because his defense of Section 407's constitutionality is better served by portraying the intent of Congress to have been exclusively "to eliminate a specific flaw in the basic AFDC program - that program's tendency to induce fathers who were unable adequately to support their families to desert their homes so that their families could become eligible for benefits." Secretary's brief in No. 78-437, 13. In light of its adversarial origins,

the Secretary's presentation is undercut by the Interim Report of the Department of Justice's Task Force on Sex Discrimination. In its analysis of Section 407, the Task Force confirmed that:

The limitation of benefits to families in which the father is unemployed was intended to exclude two parent families which could qualify for benefits even though one parent was fully employed. Rather than setting employment standards for both parents, however, Congress chose to require that the male parent be unemployed, apparently on the basis of the assumption that the male is always the primary breadwinner.<sup>1</sup>

The Secretary cannot now repudiate this firmly established reading of Section 407's legislative history.

This consensus of opinion reveals the answer to the remedial issue whether the principal wage-earner or the dual wage-earner model of a sex-neutral AFDC-UF pro-

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<sup>1</sup> Task Force on Sex Discrimination, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice, Interim Report to the President 156 (Oct. 3, 1978).

gram would better "render what Congress plainly did intend, constitutional." Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 356 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Since Congress used the term "father" as a proxy for the family's principal wage-earner, the principal wage-earner model "more nearly accords with Congress' wishes." Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. at 355-56. The District Court's selection of the dual wage-earner model was thus reversible error.

II. The Secretary's Argument That His Statutory Power to Define Unemployment Precludes the Judiciary From Adopting the Principal Wage-Earner Model to Cure Section 407's Gender-Based Defect Overstates the Scope of His Power.

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Although he took no position on the remedial issue before the District Court, the Secretary now informs this Court that his regulations precluded the District Court from adopting the principal wage-earner model of the AFDC-UF program advocated by the Commissioner. With reference to 45 C.F.R. § 233.100 (a) (1) (1978) (requiring states to admit the families of "any father"

meeting federal requirements into the AFDC-UF program), the Secretary contends that:

That regulation, with a sex-neutral construction, requires that a state plan include any parent who meets federal requirements of "unemployment". No federal rule requires an "unemployed" father (or parent) to show that he has been the principal wage-earner in the family. Secretary's brief, 7.

This argument assumes its conclusion by incorporating the premise that the proper sex-neutral construction of the term "father" is the term "parent". Substitution of the indefinite term "parent" opens Section 407 to the dual wage-earner interpretation because it fails to specify which parent must be unemployed. The Secretary's argument thus begs the very question posed by the Commissioner's appeal: what sex-neutral substitute for the term "father" best fulfills the legislative conception and programmatic structure of the AFDC-UF program.

The Secretary's reliance on his rule-making powers is similarly unhelpful. Secretary's brief, 8 ("Appellant's request that the Court fashion a cy pres remedy . . . should be declined, because Congress prescribed a specific

device for filling statutory gaps. That device is the issuance of regulations by the Secretary."). In accordance with his assumption that the term "parent" is the necessary substitute for the term "father", the Secretary characterizes the selection of the principal wage-earner model as within the scope of his exclusive "authority to set the standards for the parental unemployment necessary to make a family eligible for AFDC benefits." Secretary's brief, 8. By means of this characterization, the Secretary seeks to block this Court from undertaking its own evaluation of the principal wage-earner model as the proper remedy for Section 407's gender-based defect.

The explanation for the Secretary's stratagem lies in this Court's decision in Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977). From its examination of Section 407's reference to "unemployment (as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary)", this Court concluded that:

Congress in § 407(a) expressly delegated to the Secretary the power to prescribe standards for determining what constitutes "unemployment" for purposes of AFDC-UF eligibility. In a situation of this kind, Congress entrusts to the



Secretary, rather than to the courts, the primary responsibility for interpreting the statutory term. In exercising that responsibility, the Secretary adopts regulations with legislative effect [original emphasis]. 432 U.S. at 425.

Consequently, "[w]hen a rule is legislative, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute judgment as to the content of the rule . . . ." K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §5.03 (1958).

The Secretary's reliance upon his power to define "unemployment" is a red herring, designed to distract the Court from his unreasoned substitution of the term "parent" for the term "father". With regard to the above-quoted language from Batterton v. Francis on which the Secretary relies (Secretary's brief, 6-7), Professor Davis points out that:

The Court italicized the word "delegated", and that is the key to the whole analysis.... [B]ecause the regulation was issued pursuant to that delegation, it had "legislative weight".... K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §5.03 (1978 Supp.).

The delegation of rule-making authority in Section 407 extends only to the meaning of "unemployment". It does not encompass the meaning of the term "father". Congress did not, therefore, delegate the power to expand upon its premise that only the unemployment of the family's breadwinner would deprive a family of its means of support. Any regulation revising that premise would be ultra vires. See Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 616 (1944) ("The determination of the extent of authority given to a delegated agency by Congress is not left for the decision of him in whom authority is vested."). Filling in large holes in a statutory structure — a proper administrative function — is different from building an annex.

The legislative history of the 1967 amendments to Section 407 confirms that, while delegating the power to define "unemployment" to the Secretary, Congress retained for itself the power to define the parent whose unemployment could establish eligibility. In 1967, Congress transferred the power to define "unemployment" from the states to the Secretary because the states had "adopted such varying definitions of 'unemployment' that uniform administration of the program became impossible." Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 710 at n. 6 (1975). In that same year, Congress also "expressed its displeasure with the state practice which had made

'families in which the father is working but the mother is unemployed eligible'... and restricted the program to children of unemployed fathers." 421 U.S. at 710, n. 6. Congress thus responded to these two perceived abuses of the AFDC-UF program in radically different ways. It resolved the diversity of definitions of "unemployment" by authorizing "a Federal definition of unemployment by the Secretary." H.R. Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 108 (1967); S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1967), reprinted in [1967] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2834, 2997. Congress exercised its own judgment, however, as to which parent's unemployment should establish a family's eligibility. The Secretary cannot now usurp that legislative prerogative. His rule-making power does not reach to the remedial substitution of a sex-neutral term for the term "father" which Congress itself selected in 1967.

This Court has previously rebuffed attempts by federal administrators to expand the scope of a Congressional authorization to adopt legislative rules. See Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944) (upon examining a statutory exemption for employees "within the area of production (as defined by the Administrator)" of certain commodities, this Court rejected the Administrator's regulations as ultra vires

because they expanded "the grant by Congress . . . to define the area of production beyond the plain geographic implications of that phrase"). The parenthetical qualification in Section 407, i.e., "unemployment (as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary)", should similarly be limited to the normal scope of the antecedent term "unemployment". While that term is not completely unambiguous, it denotes an individual's relationship to the labor force. See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 427-29 (1977). This Court should accordingly reject the Secretary's claim that the parenthetical delegation of discretion encompasses the subsequent term "father". Such administrative attempts to inject extraneous content into a legislative grant of authority are improper.

In short, the Secretary's rule-making powers do not provide a foundation for his present efforts to buttress the District Court's remedy.

III. Plaintiffs-Appellees and Amici Fail  
to Formulate a Remedial Principle  
Which Justifies Their Preference  
for the Dual Wage-Earner Model of  
the AFDC-UF Program.

Plaintiffs-appellees and amici argue for the dual wage-earner model of the AFDC-UF program by the simple technique of characterization. Given Justice Harlan's perception of "two remedial alternatives" for underinclusive classifications, namely invalidation and extension, Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 361 (1970), plaintiffs-appellees and amici assert that the dual wage-earner model comprises the alternative of extension in this case. By contrast, they warn that the principal wage-earner model would institute a remedy different from extension, because it would result in a "radical restructuring of the AFDC-U program." ACLU brief, 69. See also Westcott brief, 71. The principal wage-earner model would, however, similarly extend Section 407 to encompass female breadwinners. Both remedies constitute extension; the only difference is that the dual wage-earner model entails greater extension. The real issue is which model do the principles underlying the remedy of extension dictate under the circumstances of this case.

Amici represent that selection of the dual wage-earner model in this case would follow the remedial tradition established by this Court's decisions in Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), Jablon v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 430 U.S. 924 (1977), Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). ACLU brief, 72. See also Westcott brief, 62. In Goldfarb, Jablon and Wiesenfeld, this Court affirmed — without any discussion of the issue of remedy — District Court orders enjoining the Secretary from enforcing gender-based restrictions on the availability of benefits. In Frontiero, where this Court reversed a District Court ruling in favor of such a restriction, Justice Brennan's plurality opinion simply stated that: "Our conclusion in no way invalidates the statutory schemes except insofar as they require a female member to prove the dependency of her spouse." 411 U.S. at 691, n. 25. These decisions are not helpful in this case because they do not address the issue of the proper substitute for a restrictive term. They simply illustrate that one remedy for a restrictive provision is

an injunction against its enforcement.<sup>2</sup> More importantly, the decisions which amici cite fail to delineate "any consistent basis on which to ground a principled decision on extension."<sup>3</sup>

Amici nevertheless insist that this Court has usually extended underinclusive classifications by, in effect, "substituting one word for another in the defective statute or inserting words into the statute that would expand the class of individuals to whom it applies." ACLU brief, 71-72. Amici accordingly suggest that:

Remedying the state's unconstitutional exclusion of unemployed mothers involves but one change in the text of the AFDC-U provision: substitution of the term "parent" for the term "father". ACLU brief, 79.

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<sup>2</sup> See Note, Extension Versus Invalidation of Underinclusive Statutes: A Remedial Alternative, 12 Colum. J.L. and Soc. Probs. 115, 122-23 (1975). The decisions invalidating welfare residency requirements and restrictions upon benefits for illegitimate children which amici cite also involve this limited remedial technique. ACLU brief, 72 at n. 39.

<sup>3</sup> Id., 125.

By virtue of this substitution — amici point out — Section 407 would revert to its original form.

Amici overlook the essential fact that, in 1967, Congress expressly amended Section 407 in order to replace the term "parent", which it had found to be unsatisfactory, with the term "father". If the justifiable purpose of extension is "to render what Congress plainly did intend, constitutional," Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. at 356, amici's suggestion runs against the strongest evidence of legislative intent. See J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 44.13 (4th ed. 1973) ("[T]he fact that a limitation was added by amendment shows that legislative attention was focused very specifically on the question whether the limitation should be imposed...."). In order to be faithful to the intent of Congress, this Court should accordingly substitute the term "principal wage-earner". That term sex-neutrally identifies the family breadwinner whom Congress broadly assumed to be the "father".



IV. Amici's Contention That the Dual Wage-Earner Model is Preferable Because It More Closely Resembles AFDC Ignores the Distinct Nature of the AFDC-UF Program.

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In conjunction with plaintiffs-appellees (Westcott brief, 76), amici argue that the dual wage-earner model is preferable because it would render the AFDC-UF program "consistent with the gender-neutral nature of the rest of the AFDC program, in which eligibility for assistance is based on the death, absence or incapacity of either parent." ACLU brief, 79-80. Amici ignore the fundamental differences in nature between the AFDC and AFDC-UF programs which render inapposite any argument based on consistency. The AFDC program encompasses families where only one parent capable of caring for the children remains in the home. Congress acted to assist these families left without a breadwinner, King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 328 (1968), so that the remaining parent could care for the children "at home without having to go to work." Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 418 (1977). AFDC accordingly covers those families where one parent is "deceased, incapacitated or continually absent." King v. Smith, 392 U.S. at 329. The death, incapacity or absence of one parent is statutorily

presumed to require the presence of the other parent in the home and, therefore, to deprive the family of a breadwinner. The AFDC-UF program, on the other hand, assists families where two parents capable of caring for their children remain in the home. By contrast with AFDC, the AFDC-UF program thus covers intact families who retain the capacity to have one parent in the home and one parent in the labor force. See Lurie, Major Changes in the Structure of the AFDC Program Since 1935, 59 Cornell L. Rev. 825, 828 (1974) ("The addition [of AFDC-UF] marked a significant deviation from the previous objective of AFDC, which was to provide aid only to families which were incapable of supporting themselves."); Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552, 559 (1970) (The purpose of AFDC is to provide "aid to 'needy' children, except where there is a 'breadwinner' in the house who can be expected to provide such aid himself."). An intact family is presumed not to be needy unless the family breadwinner has become unemployed. Amici's suggestion that AFDC-UF should conform to AFDC ignores the substantive differences between these programs.

V. Plaintiffs-Appellees and Amici Cannot  
Escape the Fact That the Dual  
Wage-Earner Model of the AFDC-UF  
Program is Significantly More  
Expensive than the Principal Wage-  
Earner Model.

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In an effort to hide the greater costs associated with the District Court's remedy behind a veil of confusion, plaintiffs-appellees and amici twist and tear at the Commissioner's estimate of the cost differential between the principal wage-earner and the dual wage-earner models of the AFDC-UF program. Westcott brief, 68-71; ACLU brief, 81-87. However, the Commissioner stands by the cost estimates properly put before the District Court by the affidavit of a professional budget analyst (A. 49-56). Commissioner's brief, 34-37.

In their efforts to disparage the cost estimates presented by the Commissioner and the Secretary, amici finally resort to the argument that "the wide discrepancy between the two sets of figures undermines the credibility of both." ACLU brief, 82 at n. 47. The difference between the Commissioner's and the Secretary's cost estimates reflects their differing assumptions as to the rate at which potentially eligible families would begin to participate in an extended

AFDC-UF program.<sup>4</sup> The cost estimates are otherwise quite consistent.

VI. The Notion Advanced by Plaintiffs-Appellees and Amici that Adoption of the Principal Wage-Earner Model Should Be Left to Congress Improperly Implies That the Judiciary Should Abdicate Its Remedial Responsibility.

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Plaintiffs-appellees and amici uniformly insist that only Congress can evaluate the propriety of the principal wage-earner model of the AFDC-UF program. Westcott brief, 18, 77-80; ACLU brief, 25-27, 93-123. Without explaining why this Court need not similarly defer to Congress with respect to their dual wage-earner model,

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<sup>4</sup> See Memorandum of Appellee . . . Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare . . . in Partial Support of Appellant Califano's Application for a Stay, 6 at n. 6 (filed January 2, 1979, in No. 78-437).

plaintiffs-appellees declare that:

A principal wage earner test must . . . be rejected because this Court lacks the authority under Article III and the competence to resolve the many important policy issues involved in a principal wage earner test. These include the appropriate definition of a principal wage earner, the treatment of currently eligible families who would otherwise be terminated, and the political question whether such a test should be adopted since it would fall most heavily on women workers.... Resolution of these issues is appropriately left to Congress. Westcott brief, 18.

Selection of either form of extension, however, requires judicial evaluation of the factors which bear upon the remedial decision how "to render what Congress plainly did intend, constitutional." Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. at 356. Plaintiffs-appellees and amici now urge this Court to ignore Justice Harlan's admonition that:

If an important congressional policy is to be perpetuated by recasting unconstitutional legislation . . . the analytically sound approach is to accept responsibility for this position. 398 U.S. at 355.

This Court should shun the suggestion of amici that it is somehow relieved of this responsibility because its ultimate decision on remedy "is of course only a form of tentative adjudication." ACLU brief, 122. That Congress itself retains ultimate responsibility for the structure of the AFDC-UF program does not lessen this Court's independent obligation to shape a remedy consonant with the legislative history and administrative structure of the AFDC-UF program.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> This Court need only determine the appropriate sex-neutral substitute for the term "father" in Section 407. If this Court approves the term "principal wage-earner", the further definition of that term should, upon remand, be left to the administrative discretion of the Secretary under 42 U.S.C. §1302 (1976).

CONCLUSION

Appellees and amici have failed to advance any principled argument demonstrating that this Court should not reverse the District Court's order adopting the dual wage-earner model of the AFDC-UF program.

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